Institutional Changes and the Expansion of Flexible Forms of Employment in Higher Education: the case of Greek universities.

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**Abstract**

*Extensive institutional changes and restructuring are taking place in higher education within the context of the new managerialism’s ideological principles and administrative practices aimed at the fulfilment of the goals of the neoliberal political dominance. These changes involve the massification of universities, along with the reduction of government spending and the expansion of cooperation with the private sector to ensure financial resources. As a result, these changes in EU and Greek higher education alter their objectives and the character of the academic labour process, and adversely affect the functioning of universities and the cohesion within the academic community.*

**Keywords:** flexible employment, Higher education, managerialism, neoliberalism, Greece

**Introduction**

Some scholars have studied the effects of external changes that lead to the reorientation of education, as well as research and administrative practices in universities towards the expansion of control and the intensification of labour in academia (Clark, 1998; Deem, 2004; Henkel, 2000; Parker and Jary, 1995; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). However, empirical work is limited regarding how academics perceive and experience such organizational changes. Moreover, further research needs to be done with regard to the consequences of flexible working on the academic departments’ operations and the cohesion of the academic community.

The main objectives of this article are twofold: on the one hand, we engage in a critical analysis of the institutional changes made to the academic labour process brought about by the expansion of the ideological principles and administrative practices of the “New Public
Management” in higher education, on the other hand, we examine the impact of the extension of flexible forms of employment on the functioning of departments, and the cohesion of the academic community.

The article contains three sections. The first section deals with the ideological principles and administrative practices of the “New Public Management” and the main features of external institutional interventions and controls in universities. The second section analyses recent developments in Greek higher education, reflected in institutional changes, the reduction of state funding, and the concurrent increase in student enrollments. Finally, in the third section, it is argued that the increase of flexible forms of employment contributes to the deterioration of the autonomy of universities, while creating networks of “patron-client relations” and preventing the negative effects of the “educational reforms” from spilling over to permanent contract staff.

The enforcement of external controls in Universities

The expansion of the “New Public Management” of higher education in Europe

A common feature of the profound institutional changes and restructuring that have taken place in the public sector of many European countries over the past two decades has been wide recognition of the ideological principle according to which private sector practices and methods of organisation and management, in conjunction with external monitoring mechanisms, will improve the efficiency and quality of public services. This transformation of organisational structures, funding patterns and the organisational culture of employees in public sector organisations is commonly known as “New Public Management” or “New Managerialism” (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Hood et al., 1999).

According to a number of researchers (e.g., Clarke and Newman, 1997; Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Deem, 2004), “New Public Management” or “New Managerialism”, developed within the institutional and organizational context of neoliberal policies in the public sector, is nothing more than a set of ideological principles which suggesting that the “modernisation” of public services, such as health and education, could only be achieved through the use of organisational methods, managerial practices and corporate values implemented in private companies, subjecting public organisations to forces of market institutions. However, “New Public Management” should not be considered as a set of
ideological principles only, but also as a series of institutional interventions and controls necessary for effective implementation. The developments advanced by “New Public Management” are distinguished by three main elements: enforcing accountability through strict external controls to ensure short-term, predetermined and commensurable outcomes; increasing internal monitoring devices and mechanisms of conformity; and altering the organisational culture of public sector employees.

The implementation of “New Managerialism” in the public sector was initially based on the reduction of public funding, the broadening of modes of cooperation with private sector companies, outsourcing of certain activities (e.g. catering, cleaning, computing), as well as on an effort to change employees’ values and attitudes (Willmott, 1995; Clarke and Newman, 1997; Exworthy and Halford, 1999). The submission of public sector employees to the “market discipline” and to private sector employment patterns was promoted by adopting a series of administrative practices (cost-centres, target-setting and performance management), which were accompanied by a wide range of ideological mechanisms, as well as symbols and rituals of modern corporate culture (e.g. “long hours culture”, “doing more for less”, reinforcement of internal competition).

Despite variations across the OECD countries in the implementation of “New Public Management”, a “managerial reform movement to public services” started to take place from the late 1970’s (Hood et al., 1999: 189-190; see also Exworthy and Halford, 1999), and resulted in the development of a “managerial state”, counter to alternative bureau-professional organisational modes (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Within higher education institutions, the “New Public Management” was implemented through a series of institutional changes and restructuring leading to the commercialisation of higher education and the transformation of the labour process of academics (Miller, 1995; Parker and Jary, 1995; Prichard and Willmott, 1997; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Deem, 2004; Ogbonna and Harris, 2004; Deem and Brehony, 2005). Hence, educational reforms took place within the context of wider socioeconomic perceptions and approaches designed to apply “market discipline” to public sector organisations. “New Public Management”, was not implemented in all European countries in an identical way and at the same time. Naturally, there are consistencies and differences between examined cases. A good case in point is the Greek experience, which is a characteristic example of delayed enforcement of the necessary
institutional interventions and controls due to the resistance of the academic community members, academics and students alike.

Of course, because it was not possible to directly apply principles of “market discipline”, varied “simulations” were initially promoted, based on the allocation of state funding according to efficiency criteria imposed externally and used to assess the quality of research and teaching activities in an objective manner. Universities (and their departments) were thus forced to take part in the increasing competition for a higher position in the ranking of universities, so as to ensure additional funding resources (Deem and Brehony, 2005; Maroudas and Kyriakidou, 2009). Slaughter and Leslie (1997: 11) argue that “market-like behaviours refer to institutional and faculty competition for moneys, whether these are from external grants and contracts, endowment funds, university-industry partnerships, institutional investment in professors’ spinoff companies, or student tuition and fees. What makes these activities market-like is that they involve competition for funds from external resource providers”.

**Key features of institutional change in universities**

The extent and dynamics of the implementation and consolidation of external institutional interventions and controls in universities vary according to the degree of economic development¹, the peculiarities of the national systems of higher education, the balance of social forces and the opposition of the academic community. However, some of the main characteristics of these interventions tend to have many similarities across EU member-states, because the educational reforms promoted respond to changes brought about by globalisation, the weakening of the role of the public sector, the implementation of post-fordist production systems and new technologies of knowledge management, and the pursuit of efficiency as an end in itself. In particular, the main characteristics of the external institutional interventions could be summarised as follows:

- The gradual transition from a relatively elitist towards a mass system of higher education. This was achieved by increasing the number of students enrolled in universities, establishing new universities and departments, and upgrading the institutions of technological education to higher-level institutions. These developments aimed at regulating the education process on the basis of market needs and graduates’ employability (Parker and Jary, 1995; Prichard and Willmott, 1997; Clark, 1998; Deem,
The massification of higher education should not be confused with its democratisation, since it did not ensure opportunities for equal access to universities, especially to departments that provide degrees of higher social status (Michea, 1999).

- The reduction of public funding per student, which also means increasing the ratio of students to academic staff (Bryson, 2004). This sharpened the competition between universities and departments for raising additional funds (Clarke and Newman, 1997). According to Deem (2004: 109), “UK universities have encountered big reductions in the unit of public resource per student (e.g. a 36% fall in funding per student between 1989 and 1997) and increased funding differentials in favour of the teaching of science and technology subjects at the expense of arts, humanities and social sciences”. At the same time, the reduction of funding per student constitutes the basic means for strengthening vertical channels of power by imposing tight fiscal control (Clarke and Newman, 1997).

- The promotion of entrepreneurial activities within universities, and the expansion of forms of collaboration with business corporations (Soley, 1995; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The aim was to maintain the ability of universities to carry out basic research and teaching activities in a relatively independent manner (Clark, 1998). This led to the establishment of a “business climate” and the adoption of “market-like behaviours” within universities, which tend to transform the values, beliefs and attitudes of academics (Henkel, 2000; Ylijoki, 2005). At the same time, a new academic identity emerged, the so-called “academic-managers” (Deem, 2003; Henkel, 2000) that were the principal agents in materialising the organisational changes imposed by the educational reforms.

- The enforcement of a wide range of controls and monitoring mechanisms. These include the external assessment of the quality of research and teaching, and the compilation of performance indicators and rankings of universities. This would further facilitate the pursuit of three specific objectives: i) the allocation of limited public funds based on quantitative criteria; ii) the codification of the academic labour process based on the use of comparable efficiency indicators for closer internal and external monitoring; and iii) finally, the encouragement of universities’ potential “clients”, mainly students (Maroudas and Kyriakidou, 2009).

The implementation of the aforementioned external institutional interventions resulted in the expansion of the ideological principles and administrative practices of new managerialism in higher education. Rhetoric in favour of new managerialism and subsequent reforms would
point to improvements in the quality of teaching and research work. Instead the institutional interventions have reduced the professional autonomy of academics and turned universities away from their mission towards open and independent research and teaching.

**Institutional changes in Greek higher education**

**The massification of higher education**

In Greek higher education the number of students enrolling in universities and technological education institutes has more than doubled in the period 1993-2000, rising from 40,050 to 81,945. The increase of postgraduate students in universities was equally impressive: while there were approximately 4,500 postgraduate students in 1994, their number rose to 12,000 in 1997, 20,422 in 2000, 50,007 in 2003, and 68,597 in the 2006-2007 academic year (National Statistical Service of Greece). Certain views attribute the massive expansion of higher education in Greece to two factors: i) the high rate of youth unemployment and, thus, the social demand for higher education degrees as an important prerequisite for employment in positions that require relatively skilled labour and offer higher wages; and ii) expectations for upward social mobility pursued by the middle classes (Karamezzini, 2007). This approach, albeit convincing, is rather inadequate, because the massive expansion of higher education was observed in all European countries, even those where youth unemployment is significantly lower compared to Greece. Alternative views contend that the massification of higher education is mainly due to transformations in the production process that “upgraded” job qualifications, and thus demanded skills and training attained at the higher education level (Economakis, Kyriakidou and Maroudas, 2008).

The massive expansion of higher education was achieved through the creation of a plethora of departments under funding from the European Community Support Frameworks. It is noteworthy that a large number of these new departments do not identify with a specific field of scientific knowledge and their activities specialise in applied research. Thus, numerous courses with no autonomous and distinct scientific orientation are being established, such as, for example, “skill development” courses, in place of basic courses, which are either being restricted or removed. This process leads to a fusion of traditional university education and skill training (Economakis, Maroudas and Kyriakidou, 2006). In light of these developments, an ever-growing segment of university courses are now oriented towards practical vocational training in order to satisfy immediate market needs and offer degrees of ambiguous working rights (Katsikas and Sotiris, 2003).
Furthermore, at the postgraduate level, most of the programmes referred to as “Specialisation Postgraduate Diplomas”, quintupled from 1993 to 2004 (National Statistical Service of Greece) with no provisions to ensure necessary academic staff, infrastructure and equipment to support research and training activities. These programmes were established through the European Community Support Frameworks to promote vocational training in response to current market needs formed by the rapid change in the social and technical division of labour (Economakis, Kyriakidou and Maroudas, 2008). Within this context, postgraduate studies oriented towards basic research were restricted. Consequently, the majority of postgraduate programmes do not offer students the opportunity to build their knowledge-base and skills for scientific research at the Ph.D. level. Instead students are mainly granted certificates of specialisation with questionable “exchange value” in the labour market. Moreover, several of these postgraduate programmes require tuition fees, either to cover basic operation expenses or increase faculty members’ remuneration.

The decline in state funding and the search for external funds
Following the general trend in reducing government expenditure, public education in Greece, particularly at the university level, is being under-financed. During the 1993-2002, government expenditure per first-year student declined by 25% at constant prices (see Apekis, 2006). Public spending per student in 2005 estimated at 4,928 € per year, compared to the OECD average at 8,102 € and the average for EU-19 at 6,990 € (OECD, 2008). Of course, the fall in public spending per student is related to the increase of the ratio of students to academic staff. In Greece, at the higher education level, the ratio of students to academic staff, equivalent to 27.8 in 2006, is far worse than the OECD average (15.3) and the EU-19 average (16.0) (OECD, 2008), which marks the deterioration of the quality of education. The reduction of public spending in higher education institutions forces academics and universities to seek for external funding resources. The rising importance of external funds underlines the dependence of academic labour on market objectives and private-financial performance criteria, which constitutes a process of indirect privatisation of higher education under a superficial public guise. This dependence is expressed either with the development of “entrepreneurial niches” within public universities or the commercialisation of a wide spectrum of education and research activities.
In Greek higher education, the so far “informal” introduction of tuition fees in certain postgraduate programmes is expected to be legitimised and generalised: recent legislation (Law 3685/2008, Law 4009/2011 and Law 4076/2012) consolidate the introduction of tuition fees and the provision of additional earnings to academic staff. Thus, the new legislations “legalises” a posteriori the current situation established in several postgraduate programmes. Also, it contributes to the stratification of academics and the intensification of competition, especially among similar postgraduate programmes in order to attract “clients - students”. Moreover, the law for Postgraduate Studies indirectly contributes to the degradation of undergraduate and postgraduate studies: since teaching in several postgraduate programmes is associated with increased earnings, academics will attempt to supplement their stagnant salaries by increasing their teaching hours in postgraduate programmes.

Due to the aforementioned external interventions, a significant part of higher education is not covered by public spending, which alters the public nature of universities and the meaning of free access to education institutions. This is mostly evident when university studies are divided into undergraduate and postgraduate courses, where the latter forms a preferential area for establishing the “corporatisation” of higher education and the development of “market-like” behaviours in academic staff. The aforementioned institutional changes - especially recent legislation (Law 4009/2011 and Law 4076/2012) - along with the drastic cuts in higher education public spending, mark a rapid transition from a hybrid model consisted of elements of both the state and the self-governed university to a model of “entrepreneurial university”.

**Changes to the academic labour process**

**The expansion of flexible forms of employment in universities**

Despite variations in the academic tenure of university employees in the EU, there is an explicit tendency towards the increase of temporary and part-time employment contracts. In Greece, the massification of higher education was based on the rapid expansion of flexible forms of employment. There was a rapid increase in the number of academics with fixed-terms contract that usually cover a period of six months to one year (with prospects of renewal). In Table 1, we observe that during the period 1998-2007, the number of contractors, rose from 912 to 2,606 (185.7%), even though the number of undergraduate departments in Greek universities increased from 196 to 258 (31.6%), and the number of permanent contract staff increased from 5,729 to 9,268 (61.8%). Furthermore, while the
average number of permanent contract staff per department rose from 29.2 to 35.9, the average number of contractors (“auxiliary teaching staff”) more than doubled (from 4.7 to 10.1). As a result, the average number of permanent contract staff per department declined by 86.3% to 78.1% and correspondingly increased the proportion of contractors from 13.7% to 21.9%. In Table 2, we observe that the ratio of contractors over permanent contract staff rose from 15.9% in 1998 to 28.1% in 2007. This increase was accompanied by the wider introduction of several forms of temporary and informal employment in teaching and research (external collaborators receiving remuneration from postgraduate tuition fees, Ph.D. candidates, etc.).

It becomes evident that there is a huge discrepancy between the increase in universities, departments, permanent contract and fixed-term contract staff. The absolute and relative increase of contractors is a universal phenomenon observed in universities throughout the country, counter to widely-accepted views that this took place only in recently-founded peripheral universities which incorporated a number of newly-established departments. However, according to figures in Tables 1 and 2, employment conditions based on temporary contractual relations apply not only to peripheral universities, but also to an increasing number of universities in the city of Athens and Thessaloniki, particularly those that have created graduate programmes with tuition fees, regardless of whether they have established new departments or not. The data also shows that the increase in the number and proportion of contractors is independent of the “seniority” of the university, including the oldest central universities, as well as peripheral universities founded three decades ago.

From these observations we conclude that the rise in the number of contractors is attributed not only to the development of higher education institutions, the creation of new departments, and the subsequent imperative to respond to imminent needs with the employment of temporary staff. It is mainly used as a vehicle for the expansion and consolidation of flexible forms of employment within Greek Universities (Nikolaidis, 2007). This policy was promoted by circumventing the Presidential Decree 407/80, which was originally introduced to meet the specific and special demands for teaching staff.

We must note that interventions on teaching and research activities were also accompanied by corresponding changes in a wide range of administrative operations conducted in
universities that include the outsourcing of ancillary activities (e.g. feeding, cleaning, building maintenance and storage etc). This further supports efforts to subordinate all the activities of the university to the “market discipline” within the context of the new managerialism’s ideological principles and administrative practices aimed at the fulfilment of the goals of the neoliberal political dominance.

**The impact of flexible employment conditions on the cohesion of the academic community**

As already discussed in the previous section, almost 1/3 of the total number of academic staff is employed with fixed-terms contract. Hence, an important share of teaching activities has now been undertaken by contractors, so that the curriculum depends highly on temporary staff. Under these circumstances, possible cuts in funds for contractors, following restrictive fiscal policy, may increase teaching hours allocated to permanent contract staff. This will not only increase their workload at the expense of research, but might also compel them to teach courses that are unrelated to their field of research, with evident adverse effects on the quality of teaching (Nikolaidis, 2007). Also, the expansion of flexible employment conditions has serious effects on the operation of universities and particularly their autonomy. Since the curriculum largely depends on constant, time-consuming and unpredictable negotiations with the government for funds allocated to contractors, the departments are in no position to determine the content of the curriculum in a timely and exclusive manner to ensure the smooth operation of universities.

By appointing a significant part of teaching and research activities to contractors, permanent contract staff become highly stratified in terms of influence, wages, working conditions and career prospects, leading to a higher fragmentation of academic labour (Willmott, 1995; Ogbonna and Harris, 2004). In Greek universities working conditions and career prospects for temporary faculty members are extremely unfavourable. Delays in payments range from three months up to two years\(^\text{45}\) and create insecurity, which is exacerbated by the uncertain outcomes of negotiations with the government for the allocation of funds among universities and department. When funds are insufficient to meet the departments’ needs, it is common practice to hire more than one contractor at the price of one. This reduces salaries and converts fixed-terms staff to part-time employees. It also contributes not only to quantitative variations in the number of hired contractors staff and courses offered by the department, but also to a type of functional “flexibility” that results in frequent changes in the kind of courses
that contractors teach. Moreover, the fact that contractors are deprived of any rights to participate in the decision-making processes of their departments alters the principle of self-governance in universities, on the one hand, and cultivates networks of “patron-client” relations between permanent and fixed-terms staff members, on the other (Nikolaidis, 2007).

Factors such as job insecurity, the ever-increasing division of academic labour (between teaching and research), and the strong stratification of academic staff (between permanent contract and fixed-terms contract staff) have contributed to the intensification of academic work, the weakening of “team spirit” among colleagues, and the deformation of academics’ professional identity. It is now clear that in many EU and Greek universities, a “lower class” of academics has emerged, which includes teachers and researchers with temporary and part-time employment contracts. This “lower class” has been used to shield permanent contract staff from the negative effects of the massification of higher education (Wilson, 1991; Miller, 1995; Dearlove, 1997).

The expansion of flexible forms of employment in universities and the creation of a form of dualism in the internal labour market (permanent contract staff-core and fixed-terms contract staff-periphery, see Kyriakidou and Maroudas, 2007) have prevented the negative consequences of recent educational reforms (including the larger workload, the longer hours, the more extensive monitoring and controls) from spilling over to permanent employees (Willmott, 1995). In addition, these conditions have secured privileges to academics of various top universities and scientific fields to access trust-building mechanisms that secure discretionaty tactics and career prospects (Burawoy, 1985), and use of technical means to practice direct and intrusive surveillance over the rest of the academic staff.

Such developments in the employment status of academics, in conjunction with the restriction of their professional autonomy and the disciplinary nature of provisions included in the new legislative framework, might imply that the academic labour process will tend to distance itself from past models of autonomous craftsmanship and conform to models determined by interests and demands that are external to the university (Wilson, 1991; Dearlove, 1997). According to Parker and Jary (1995: 321), “...we see a move from elite specialisation with strong professional controls toward a ‘fordist’ mass production
arrangement ... because it seems that comparability and the standardisation (of institutions, managers, academics and students) are central to NHE (new higher education) organisation”.

The gradual enforcement of external controls restricted academics’ discretion over the organisation and materialisation of their work, which progressively eroded their professional autonomy within the academic labour process and reduced not only their social status, but also their pecuniary earnings from the academic profession (Wilson, 1991; Halsey, 1992; Willmott, 1995; Harvie, 2000). The “New Public Management”, its ideological principles and administrative practices, have been interpreted by a significant part of the academic population, particularly those of the “lower classes”, as an effort that reduces their autonomy, intensifies their work, and increases monitoring and control of academic activities (Barry, Chandler and Clark, 2001; Ogbonna and Harris, 2004).

One of the main objectives of the promoters of educational reforms and organisational changes within universities is the weakening of collective resistance to external intervention in the academic process (Maroudas and Kyriakidou, 2009). This is manifested in the implementation of supportive human resource management practices and the minimisation of the direct and/or potential conflicts between those who express past value-systems (academic freedom, development of critical thinking, independence of research, collegial decision-making etc.), and those who tend to embody the new norms and behavioural patterns (pursuit of additional financial resources by imposing tuition fees, development of entrepreneurial activities, centralisation of decision-making processes, individualisation of pay, etc.).

Efforts for reducing collective conflicts drew support from the ever-increasing division of academic labour (research and teaching), the rise in job insecurity, the enforcement of external discipline mechanisms, and the differentiation between different groups of academics, particularly between permanent and temporary staff. To this end, the new institutional framework for higher education includes provisions for the external assessment of academic departments and the reduction of strikes under the threat of losing semesters.

Even though the overwhelming majority of academics do not abide to the values, rules and norms of new managerialism (Deem, 2003; Ogbonna and Harris, 2004; Ylijoki, 2005), they individually tend to choose compromise, adjustment and conformism over resistance. According to Barry, Chandler and Clark (2001: 98), “in reacting to processes of managerial
change our interviewees have sometimes accommodated, for example to peer review, ignored or circumvented pressures to increase workload and act in autocratic ways, and (re)negotiated, mediated and moderated the harsher effects of recent changes”.

Conclusions

The external institutional interventions (including significant increases in the number of students, reductions of public funding per student, greater competition between and within universities for additional financial resources, and tight external controls) imposed in European and Greek universities as educational reforms led to the gradual transformation of their operation and education/research orientation. They also resulted in changes in the academic labour process by intensifying the work of academics, reducing their professional autonomy and expanding temporary and part-time employment conditions.

The massification of Greek universities was based on the sharp rise of the ratio of contractors over permanent contract staff, which was accompanied by the expansion of various forms of temporary and informal employment in the education and research process. The unfavourable working conditions of contractors are characterised by delays in payments, job insecurity and uncertainty in the number of funds available each year to universities, and the widespread practice of fund-sharing between more than one contractors.

By appointing a substantial part of teaching and research work to academic staff employed on fixed-terms contracts, universities are subject to the stratification of academics, the increase in the division of academic labour, and the weakening of the collegiality and the cohesion of the academic community. At the same time, the rise in the ratio of contractors is mainly applied as a means, on the one hand, to consolidate the implementation of flexible employment conditions in both academic and administrative staff of universities, and, on the other, to mitigate the negative consequences of educational reforms on permanent employees. Consequently, the expansion of temporary and part-time employment in universities facilitated the acceptance of external institutional interventions by academics, which gradually reduced forms of collective resistance against these interventions.

Notes

1 See Economakis, Maroudas and Kyriakidou (2006) for a detailed discussion on the interaction of institutional changes with: i) failure of the production system to adequately exploit accumulated scientific knowledge in
favour of corporate profitability, which is the main reason behind the trend for “re-directing” the objectives of public universities towards applied research; and ii) changes in the production process towards more “intellectually-oriented” jobs (knowledge workers) that “upgraded” job qualifications and thus compelled workers to attain further skills and training in higher education institutions.

2 For a classification of the basic characteristics of the main University governance models see: Olsen 2007 και Dobbins, Knill and Vögtle 2011.

3 In Greek universities the academic hierarchy includes four levels – lecturer, assistant professor, associate professor, and professor. At the first two levels, academics are employed for a specific term (3 to 7 years for lecturers and 3 years for assistant professors), whereas the last two lead to permanent positions. We must add that there is a provision for assistant professors to be granted permanent positions, after evaluation, at the end of their term. Academics employed in any of these four levels of hierarchy are considered part of the “Teaching and Research Staff” of each department. Academics with fixed-terms contracts are officially not considered a member of this body, and thus have no voting rights in decision-making processes and limited access to research funds and infrastructure, despite the fact that they have completed their PhD studies and undertake an equal share of teaching and research activities within the department at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. In the remainder of this paper, we shall refer to academics with fixed-terms contracts as “contractors”, as opposed to permanent contract staff, in accordance to the literal Greek translation.

4 The delay in payments can lead to even more unfavourable cases where contractors are employed in peripheral universities and are forced to endure additional travel and accommodation expenses without being paid. Thus, at the beginning of their career and in light of conditions of job insecurity, younger scientists that enter the job market eventually serve as informal “lenders” of Greek higher education.

References


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### Table 1: Number of faculty members and departments across Greek universities in the period 1998-2007

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<td>National and Kapodistrian University of Athens</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>698</td>
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<td>170</td>
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<td>47</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* 1998, School of Medicine not included (620 permanent contract staff)

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece
### TABLE 2: Ratio of Fixed-terms contract staff over Permanent contract staff across Greek universities, (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIVERSITIES</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<tr>
<td>National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (*)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Technical University of Athens</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1998, School of Medicine not included (620 permanent contract staff)

*Source: National Statistical Service of Greece*

### Author Details

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Evangelos Nikolaidis is Assistant Professor in Political Economy of Agriculture at the Department of Economics, University of Crete. His main research interests include the contribution of the agro-food system in economic development and the relations between agriculture and environment.

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