Structure, Agency and Cultural Capital as Control over Knowledge Production in Policy Formation: Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan

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Abstract

As globalization has rendered knowledge constitutive of global economic capital, scholars have shifted their attention regarding Bourdieu’s (1973) notion of cultural capital from one focused on the reproduction of inequalities through the processes of distribution of “official knowledge” to a focus the processes whereby dominant groups maximize their control over its production (Apple 1993). This shift in emphasis has been particularly compelling to educational policy scholars who have proposed various ways in which Bourdieu’s notions of field, habitus, and capital could advance our theoretical resources to explore the struggle among elite global policy actors for control over knowledge production in policy formation (Lingard, Rawolle & Taylor 2005; Rawolle and Lingard 2008). In almost every instance, however, these scholars come to the conclusion that Bourdieu’s conceptual trilogy of field, habitus and capital are moving targets: just as one thinks one is reaching clarity, they are rendered obscure, either by Bourdieu’s multivalent use of them, or because at closer inspection, they seem to point to a wild profusion of conceptual exceptions to Bourdieu’s own formulations. In this article, I offer a case study that hopes to contribute to advancing Bourdieu’s work as well as to the “wild profusion” of conceptual elaboration his work has inspired. The case study explores the ways in which domestic and international donor stakeholders negotiated control over knowledge production in Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP).
A Critical Theorist for a Post-Critical World? Globalization, Educational Policy and Bourdieu

As globalization has rendered knowledge constitutive of global economic capital, scholars have shifted their attention regarding Bourdieu’s (1973; also Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) notion of cultural capital from one focused on the reproduction of inequalities through the processes of *distribution* of “official knowledge” to a focus on the reproduction of inequalities through the processes whereby dominant groups maximize their *control over its production* (Apple 1993). In a knowledge economy, the struggle is not merely about dominant elites gaining control over knowledge for the purposes of transmission and innovation but also about gaining pre-emptive control over other elites’ access to knowledge for the purposes of transmission and innovation.

This shift in emphasis has been particularly compelling to educational policy scholars who have proposed various ways in which Bourdieu’s notions of field, habitus, and capital could advance our theoretical resources to explore the struggle among elite global policy actors for control over knowledge production in policy formation (Lingard, Rawolle & Taylor 2005; Rawolle and Lingard 2008). This scholarship dovetails a growing interest in Bourdieu’s relevance for studying inter- as well as intra-organizational dynamics (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008; Vaughan 2008) In almost every instance, however, these scholars come to the conclusion that Bourdieu’s conceptual trilogy of field, habitus and capital are moving targets: just as one thinks one is reaching clarity, they are rendered obscure, either by Bourdieu’s multivalent use of them, or because at closer inspection, they seem to point to a wild profusion of conceptual exceptions to Bourdieu’s own formulations. The latter reflections cluster around two main themes: (1) the relative importance of structure versus agency in Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and practice and whether, in the end, his rendering of habitus is so deterministic that it undermines Bourdieu’s belief in the possibility of innovation in practice (King 2000; Mouzelis 2007; Mutch 2003; Reay 2004) and (2) “how do we conceptualize those experiences that do not fit within an exchange-value model of self and culture” (Skeggs 2004, 75; see also Adkins 2004; Houston 2002; Laberge 1995; Lawler 2005; Reay 2005). Scholars concerned with this second question query in
particular Bourdieu’s relevance for understanding gendered dispositions, including those related to knowledge production (Kenway and McLeod 2005) as well as gendered forms of capital, such as emotional capital (Reay 2005). In many ways, these are scholars trying to find relevance for a critical scholar in a post-critical world, fleshing out some important tensions in Bourdieu’s work between structure and agency, imposition and innovation that help us better grasp the nuances and complexities of educational policy formation for our times.

In this article, I offer a case study that hopes to contribute to advancing Bourdieu’s work as well as to the “wild profusion” of conceptual elaboration his work has inspired. The case study explores the ways in which domestic and international donor stakeholders negotiated control over knowledge production in Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP). It thus offers a fruitful context for understanding some of the complexities of structure and agency, imposition and innovation in relation to knowledge production and utilization within the global educational policy field.

Methodology and Presentation of Data

In August and September of 1998, I interviewed fourteen Ministry of Education (MINED) officials and eight representatives of the primary international donor organizations who participated in the dialogues that took place between the end of 1995 and May 1998 regarding Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan. My initial interest was to collect policy actors’ accounts of their perceptions of the planning process. Given the sensitive nature of the study, informants were given the option of approving all printed quotes in context as well as anonymity when requested. Several expressed a preference that I delay publication while the Plan was being formulated and I complied.

As an oral historian, I have learned that one can learn a lot about the context of policy formation by asking critical players their version of the story—and there were consistent (within organizations) but varied (across organizations) versions of the story. In conducting member checks of earlier drafts of this article, I found there was general consensus regarding not only individual accounts but that other stakeholders had
different versions of the story. Participants’ awareness that other stakeholders occupying different positions within the policy field recounted different experiences suggests their awareness of the relations between power, cultural capital, and habitus; that is, the ways in which different organizational stakeholders tell their story is itself an embodied expression of organizational habitus (a term I will elaborate in a moment).

Before turning to stakeholder’s accounts of the process, I would like to propose an understanding of habitus and capital that is more grounded within the educational policy field. I will then turn to the case study itself and while I will refer broadly to how different aspects of the study illustrate qualities and dynamics of field, habitus and capital, I will save most of my theorizing for the final section of the article, where I will also propose some of the “wild profusion of unthinkable” toward which theorizing this case with Bourdieu seems to point.

Field, Habitus and Cultural Capital as Control over Knowledge Production in Educational Policy: An Overview

Fields “denote arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital” (Swartz 1998 117; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). Within a field such as that of educational policy, actors engage in struggles to impose the cultural capital and dispositions through which they make sense of and giving meaning to knowledge production and utilization as legitimate. These dispositions encompass the values, attitudes, and embodied practices regarding knowledge and its production and utilization: what is knowledge and how is it constituted, who legitimately produces knowledge; what is the relative importance of knowledge producers in the formation of policy and so on. Fields thus constitute the “structure of the social setting in which habitus operates” (Swartz 1998, 117). As a “spatial metaphor” (Swartz 1998) fields not only “suggests rank and hierarchy,” they are constituted by rank and hierarchy so that competing elites within a field with competing orientations (habitus) will spatially embody the field in ways that reflect the relative value of their cultural capital within it. Fields are thus “contested terrain” to the degree their very ontology is disputed by elites
within the field. For instance, we might suspect that the topography of global education policy field favored by the World Bank and constituted by and constitutive of its orientation to the field (and embodied in its organizational practices) might be quite different than that favored by a donor country or a recipient country. Control of cultural capital for knowledge production within the educational policy field thus includes control over the very definition and meaning attributed to the field.

Habitus within the educational policy field is one’s orientation to knowledge production and utilization. Throughout this article I use the term “orientation” interchangeably with “habitus.” While I wish to honor Bourdieu’s terminology, the term “habitus”—by virtue of it sounding like “habit” or “habitual”—tends to focus us too much on the automatic/unconscious aspects of the way we do the things we do; this is what seems to trouble critics who find Bourdieu deterministic. Orientation suggests that a groups’ set of cultural practices is comprised of a large—but not infinite—“world of meaning” (Avruch & Scimecca 1993) that is symbolic, material and embodied in practice. “Orientation” subsumes this unconscious/structural aspect of habitus, but also conveys the sense of “tending toward” rather than “fixed in,” allowing creativity and innovation in practice that Bourdieu believed were possible over time.

Reimers and McGinn (1997) propose three models to illustrate the ways in which educational policymakers approach the relationship between research (knowledge production and utilization) and policy formation that capture three competing habituses (or orientations) to educational policy formation. While neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive these three orientations suggest a range of habituses of knowledge production and utilization, each in turn establishing certain forms of knowledge as more legitimate than others in policy formation. Different orientations to knowledge production subsequently bring (and legitimate) different stakeholders into the policy formation process and thus influence which (and how) knowledge is made available for use and how the field itself should be constituted.

In a policy formation habitus constituting and constituted by policy dialogue as persuasion, research is viewed as an objective means to achieve policy goals established a priori. Knowledge derives its power from its persuasiveness within a laissez-faire “marketplace of ideas”; control over its production in this case is not relevant because all
knowledge is assumed to be objective when carried out by legitimate knowledge producers—“experts” who hold a high degree of cultural (embodied scientific training) as well as symbolic capital (advanced degrees). The relative influence of political capital and holders of political capital is rendered invisible under the guise that “objective knowledge”—not politics or power—directs policy formation and implementation.

In a policy formation habitus constituting and constituted by policy dialogue as negotiation, knowledge shapes policy as a result of negotiations between researchers (knowledge producers) and policymakers (knowledge consumers). As in the first approach, researchers and policymakers remain distinct in their roles, but knowledge is utilized in a way that explicitly acknowledges the broader political and social context in which policymakers must choose their informed options. In this instance, researchers control knowledge production (greater cultural capital) while policymakers control knowledge utilization (greater political and symbolic capital). Policy formation is ultimately a result of the degree to which the space between knowledge production and utilization is contested terrain. In others words, is the “knowledge produced” the cause or the result of the political context in which it is utilized?

In policy dialogue as participation and organizational learning, Reimers and McGinn suggest a third possible policy formation habitus. This approach takes a more constructivist view of knowledge production and utilization, with policy becoming “a means to facilitate dialogue and reflection...[and] incorporate the knowledge gained by all relevant stakeholders in the change process” (p. 39). The practices of knowledge production and utilization of this habitus legitimate the cultural capital of a much broader range of stakeholders.

Reimers and McGinn’s framework suggests the kind of orientations to knowledge production and utilization that different actors bring (and contest) within the “global educational policy field” (Lingard, Rawolle, & Taylor 2005). We can think of the various national, international and multinational institutions as “organizations in a field” (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008), each bringing specific orientations and dispositions to the practice of educational policy formation (an organizational habitus). We can also think of “organizations as fields” (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, Reay 2008) or of sites of intraorganizational contestation and negotiation in which the practices of specific actors
differentially positioned within an organization help to shape and transform organizational dispositions over time. Contestation and reproduction of habitus not only occur between monolithic institutions but also through the actions and interactions of their individual representatives. This tends to “loosen” the deterministic quality sometimes attributed to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. As Mouzelis (2007) observes a specific habitus carrier has to take in account both the game's institutional structure (i.e. the relationships between roles/positions), and figurational structures (i.e. the relationships between actual players). Figurational structures are not reducible to institutional structures, since there is often a discrepancy between what is demanded by a role's normative requirements and what actually happens in the context of the game's concrete interactive processes. (http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/6/9.html, paragraph 2.2.)

Each “player” within the field of global educational policy brings to the contest various forms of cultural capital whose value within the field is contingent to the historical evolution of the value assigned to different forms of cultural capital and contextual relative to other forms of capital in the field.

**Orienting Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Planning Process to Policy Dialogue as Participation for Organizational Learning: An Historical Overview**

Mozambique’s Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) is a rolling five year national framework for guiding sectoral development and financial support with three main objectives: expand access, increase quality and strengthen institutional capacity and decentralization (Mozambique 1998c, 1998d). The plan was elaborated between 1995 and May 1998. The national-level process of elaboration was subsequently repeated at provincial, district and school levels. The Ministry of Education (MINED) hoped the sector-wide approach will move international aid to non-earmarked funds (Martins 1997).

The MINED engaged the international donor community in a process akin to policy dialogue as participation and organizational learning that was explicitly designed to shift control over the production and utilization of research (knowledge production) in educational policy formation from the international donor community to
the Ministry of Education. Initially, the international donor community applauded the effort as an example of the type of “capacity building” the donor community was trying to encourage in the Mozambican public sector. This approach also shared an affinity with the changing ethos of international assistance regarding knowledge production. Donor - recipient relationships are increasingly viewed as “partnerships” and donors as “partners,” an acknowledgment that bilateral agreements benefit both financial donors and recipient countries.

With this orientation to policy formation the MINED hoped to redress inequities that developed in the education sector over the last three decades. At the time of Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975, the country’s illiteracy rate was close to 98% (Isaacman 1987). The newly independent country’s socialist government invested heavily in education. By the late 1980’s the country’s promising advances in school expansion and access were halted by national and regional conflicts that all but destroyed the country’s infrastructure, including over 60% of the country’s schools (Isaacman 1987). Conflict limited communication and travel outside of the provincial capitals, compromising MINED’s capacity to oversee the sector.

The context of emergency further weakened the Ministry’s institutional capacity as international aid poured into the sector. Bi-lateral agreements dominated virtually all of the Ministry’s operations. Donors have tended to focus their resources and projects in specific provinces, causing imbalances in the sector as a whole.

This situation not only marked MINED’s institutional capacity but also its ownership of research production and utilization. The country’s plummeting economic situation led to a structural adjustment program, which diminished the salaries and morale of civil servants, sixty percent of whom are MINED employees. At the same time, procurement agreements with international donors regarding technical assistance caused an internal brain drain within the Ministry as its personnel sought out relatively lucrative consultancy opportunities or left civil service altogether for positions with international organizations. This strain on institutional capacity and research production and utilization was acutely felt by the National Institute for Educational Development (INDE) a semi-autonomous organ under the auspices of MINED that produced much of the educational research that has informed educational policy in Mozambique since the
mid eighties. The majority of its budget and activities were financed and controlled by international donors (Buendia, personal interview, 1998).

Bilateral agreements kept the Ministry of Education afloat and produced a prodigious amount of applied research that led to a series of policy reports in the early 1990’s regarding the country’s most urgent educational needs and MINED’s institutional capacity. The hope to move to a sector wide approach has been the subject of discussion within policy and research circles since the late 1980s; in interviews I conducted in 1991, Vice Minister Zeferino Martins (then Director of INDE) and Minister of Education Arnaldo Nhavoto (then Vice-Minister of Education) presaged the ESSP’s main three objectives.

Systemic reform became possible after peace accords were signed in 1992. MINED proposed a National Educational Policy (Política Nacional de Educação or PNE) that was approved by the government in August 1995 (Mozambique 1995). Concurrently, the Ministry undertook conversations with UNESCO to elaborate a strategic plan that could operationalize the objectives laid out in the PNE. The Ministry invited the international community to participate in an initial brainstorming session in late 1995.

These discussions led to the formation of Ministry working groups to elaborate substantive plans for each of the areas considered critical; the groups continued their work over the next two years. The Director of Planning coordinated the writing up of the Strategic Plan, as well as meetings with international partners to gather their input and discuss the progress being made.

The Ministry did not want to conduct another sector analysis, arguing the MINED knew the sector; most of the existing research, after all, had largely been based upon fieldwork conducted by Mozambicans even if done as international consultancies. The MINED argued there was sufficient research to elaborate a plan, with a full sectoral analysis postponed until the plan’s implementation (Martins 1997); its international partners concurred.

Over the next several years, the working groups engaged in several levels of dialogue that put existing research to use in expanding MINED personnel’s knowledge of the sector as a whole with the Chairs of each working group attending regular
meetings with the Director of Planning. The Ministry also engaged the Ministry of Finance to negotiate budget support.

A first draft of the working group’s efforts was presented to the donor community in October 1996. Donor turnout was low at this point and interest in the plan seemed limited. Several of the key donors noted that this early lack of interest may have stemmed from a lack of appreciation for the plan’s significance. By early 1997, the Ministry’s work and donor interest seemed to beget donor interest in the Plan and efforts were made to coordinate discussions between the Ministry and the international donor community.

Donor interest begetting donor interest was an especially fruitful dynamic in the MINED gaining additional leverage in the process, with the help of some donor representatives. Excessive donor expression of interest in funding any aspect of the Plan tended to lead to bidding wars. A fictitious example (to protect the anonymity of my sources who would speak of this only off the record) goes something like this: a representative from UNESCO is a friend of a MINED representative; they have a coffee and the MINED representative laments that the Plan does not have sufficient funding devoted to science education in the early grades. The UNESCO representative is sympathetic to the cause. At the next Strategic Planning meeting with donors, the UNESCO representative announces that UNESCO has decided to put several million dollars into science education in the early grades. As my Mozambican and donor informants put it, this raises suspicions among other donors: why is UNESCO all of a sudden interested in being primary donor in this particular area? What does UNESCO know that we don’t know? Why should they want control over this area? By the end of the meeting, informants told me, you were almost assured that every donor that could release any funds, would throw their hats (and investments) into science education for the early grades.

These kinds of negotiations initially took place through existing coordinating meetings of MINED and its international partners (Reuniões de Coordenação or RECOORDE), chaired by the Minister of Education. The Ministry presented a second draft of the Plan in a two-day seminar in Maputo in April 1997 (CBE Consultants 1997). The Mozambican government also made a presentation of its Plan at a UNESCO
Education Initiative for Africa meeting in Paris in July of 1997. In what MINED official and donors alike characterized as an “an unprecedented move,” the Mozambican delegation included not only the Minister and Vice-Minister of Education, but also the Vice-Minister of Planning and Finance who guaranteed the Ministry of Education’s budget allocation for the Plan (approximately fifty percent of the Plan’s total expected cost over the next five years).

A third version of the Plan underwent a pre-appraisal review conducted jointly by the Ministry and the donor community in September 1997. The Minister of Education insisted that negotiation of the terms of reference for the appraisal and the appraisal itself be conducted *jointly* by the Ministry of Education and its international partners.

Some participants in the September pre-appraisal noted that the RECOORDE meetings had not always facilitated frank and open dialogue because the Minister’s ubiquitous presence and chairing of the meetings stifled frank and open discussion. Still others were frustrated by the fact that program officers representing the various embassies were generally not education experts; most were responsible for several other sectors that were also formulating sector-wide strategic plans (though each quite distinct).

To coordinate future discussions, the Ministry and the international partners formulated a Steering Committee comprised of the nine major donors and chaired by the Minister of Education. In addition, a working group of Ministry staff and donors, and headed by the Ministry’s Director of Planning, would coordinate the more operational aspects of getting the plan ready for appraisal, and setting up meetings with international partners. Sweden, as lead donor, was responsible for coordinating information and communication among the donors; however, Sweden insisted that they did so on behalf of the Ministry and that the meetings amongst donors be open, with the Minister invited to all meetings and receiving minutes (Andersson, personal interview, 1998). International partners were invited to participate in the Ministry of Education’s working groups according to their level of expertise and interests; donors whose projects were concentrated in particular sub-sectors could thus participate in the formulation of parts of the plan in which they had the most interest.
Between September 1997 and May 1998, by all accounts, the Ministry worked at fever pitch and appraisal of the strategic and financial Plans was held in May 1998 (“Appraisal Report” 1998). In preparation, the Ministry held several day-long meetings with representatives of civil society and also consulted with Provincial and District Directors of Education.

In a Joint Statement, the Ministry and the international donors agreed to adopt the strategic plan as a sectorwide framework (“Joint Statement” 1998). International partners agreed that future support and funding to the sector would be done in the spirit of this framework. While all parties agreed that the ultimate goal was for partners to move from project to non-earmarked budget support, given each donor organization’s own procedural structures, some organizations would be able and willing to do this sooner than others. A new Steering Committee was also charged with overseeing the development of provincial and district plans and the definition of joint procedures for their annual review, including mechanisms for including greater consultation with civil society and local-level stakeholders.

Mozambican and International Partners’ Perceptions of the ESSP Process of Knowledge Production and Utilization

The Ministry’s decision to elaborate a sector-wide strategic plan through a process that would increase institutional capacity and cultural capital was largely supported by the international donor community, whose representatives, when interviewed, all stressed that they believed it was key that the Ministry assume ownership of the Plan by assuming control over knowledge production. The conflicts that arose during negotiations reveal the different orientations to knowledge production and utilization different stakeholders brought to the process. The relative exchange value of the cultural capital associated with these different dispositions meant that different stakeholders wielded very different levels of power within the field at the beginning of the process. As the MINED personnel’s orientations to planning over a two-year period demonstrate, by negotiating a planning process oriented towards informed dialogue for participation and organization learning, the MINED was not only hoping to come up with a new plan, but a new topography of the educational field in which they and the
MINED’s cultural capital were more favorably positioned in relation to the international and multinational stakeholders.

The relative value of the MINED’s organizational cultural capital—a result of the education sector’s pivotal role in national development in the country’s early post-independence period—had diminished with the large-scale entry of the international donor community into the educational policy field in the early eighties. But the shift in the dominant discourse within the global educational policy field to “sectorwide planning” and “capacity-building”—itself the result of “recipient countries” slowly leveraging procurement agreements and forms of aid to show the relative dependence of “donor” countries on them—created an opening for the MINED to negotiate policy dialogue for participation.

While clashes regarding organizational orientations to knowledge production and utilization arose early on in the ESSP process they tended to occur among international partners rather than the MINED. All of the international donors, for instance, expressed displeasure with the World Bank’s orientation towards the ESSP and what they perceived to be an attempt to pressure the Ministry and “take over” or “gobble up” the process. As one representative recalled:

The relationship with the World Bank was difficult - all they do is calculations and this is not how you do education. The World Bank came with a huge mission in 1996 of 25, 30 people. They worked with the Ministry…. [t]hen they left and returned a few months later to finance the entire sector. The World Bank held meetings with the Swedes and the Ministry and their proposal was who will finance what in this shopping list and the rest we will finance. But this was without a strategy, just calculations. We were thinking about what are we going to do, how are we going to do it, to discuss with the Ministry of Education to help them define priorities, to define a path to take us somewhere. So we still did not know what we wanted to do. The World Bank was not a real partner with the Ministry, the government or the other donors. (Michel Pire, personal interview, 1998)

International partners’ impressions of the Bank’s orientation were consistent: the Bank would send an intimidating number of experts on a mission who would then attempt to “take over” the conversations or proceedings. What these international donors feared
was that the World Bank’s insinuation in the policy formation process would endanger their control over knowledge production and utilization; their description of the World Bank’s organizational habitus is virtually conflated with their sense of the World Bank usurping the process.

The World Bank’s education project officer, Inácio Manecas argued that international partners had misunderstood the Bank’s involvement in the Plan’s early stages. The Bank had funded two earlier projects for school construction and the second project was about to come to an end. When the Bank realized that the formulation of a strategic plan would take longer than expected, the Bank proposed a project that would enable school construction to continue as the strategic plan was being elaborated. As for the intention of the Bank to take over proceedings, Mr. Manecas believed this had more to do with the manner in which the Bank functions, and its internal procedures for obtaining approval for funds by its Board.

The last few months or so, we would come with a very big mission that would come all over and take over, and I’m just paraphrasing whatever I understood... the perceptions [were] that we are like paralyzing the institution... But all this was a misunderstanding. We needed to bring in people to write up the document that we are going to present to the Board. We needed to bring in people to look at the whole policy because in a SIP [Sectoral Investment Program], if we don’t agree with the whole policy, there is no way we can put money. So tensions were those kinds of tensions: “why are you guys coming, ten seven, eight, what are we going to do if you guys come to the assessment with that many people? And we would say, “Okay... but we have some background work that needs to be done...I am the [only] one, the Project Officer in this country .... There is no way one individual can... supervise, can... do the qualitative analysis and the economic analysis, financial analysis, viability and so on by himself. We need to bring people that are sitting there in headquarters in Washington, who come, do the work, and try to get whatever they can and just go back and write.

Mr. Manecas gives us a more elaborate understanding of the World Bank’s organizational habitus and even of the spatial relations through which their habitus is embodied and naturalized. Mr. Manecas argued external Bank experts had to collect their data in Mozambique and then produce their knowledge in Washington, DC because he alone is positioned within Mozambique and as competent as he is, cannot
carry out the research by himself. But it is, of course, elites within the World Bank as field, who structure the organization’s habitus so that the majority of expertise is external to Mozambique and closer to the Bank’s economic capital, “the Board.” As Mr. Manecas’ description of the Bank’s procedures suggests, the World Bank’s internal mechanisms of research utilization is what enables World Bank missions to justify their disbursement of funds to its Board. As an “organization as field” marginally positioned players within the Bank must show dominant players that they subscribe to the organization’s orientation to knowledge production, which, as discussed above seem fairly akin to what Reimers and McGinn refer to as policy dialogue as persuasion in which knowledge production (research) is conducted a priori to knowledge utilization.

The Ministry’s impression of these tensions suggests that what they were declining was not the Bank’s participation, nor the project they were proposing as such, but the ongoing insinuation of the World Bank’s dominant organizational habitus and forms of capital in the educational policy field. As the Director of Planning observed “The Bank has a particular way of doing things, they put their stamp on everything that they do. But we wished for this strategic plan, to have our stamp on it, that this plan would be the result of our efforts.” (Juvane, fieldnotes, 9/10/1998). For the Ministry, this meant weighing the cost of declining a project that was politically attractive in the short-term against legitimating an organizational habitus that would enable them to maximize their control of knowledge production in policy formation in the long-term.

The Bank wished to discuss a third or fourth project with us. The Bank’s idea was that given the rhythm of this strategic plan, and its ambitious objectives, this plan is going to take a while....and school construction would come to a halt. The government needed to continue to construct schools; this involved important political questions as elections were coming up.... And so, [the Bank argued] that this had to be done quickly as the Bank’s Board was meeting... [W]hile we were discussing a strategic plan, the Bank could initiate a project that would permit the Ministry to continue to function. It was undoubtedly an attractive proposal from a political point of view, but I think we had the courage to say that it did not make a lot of sense, that no support should be accepted that was not within the Strategic Plan’s global framework and integrated in the sector as a whole. And so, we maintained our position, but I must say we did feel some anxiety because since it had to be participatory and include as many people as possible, naturally,
elaboration of the strategic plan would take a lot of time. (Vice-Minister Zeferino Martins, personal interview 1998)

As Mr. Pires’ earlier criticisms that the Bank’s orientation to knowledge productions is not “how you do education” (Pires, personal interview 1998) suggest, other international partners’ “claims” in the education sector lay in more constructivist views of knowledge production and utilization that supported their participatory community development projects. This was similar to the Ministry’s desire for policy dialogue as participation and organization except in one respect: some donors configured the stakeholders within the field differently from the Ministry. Some of these donors supported the Ministry taking a central role as part of their participatory orientation, which configured the field as a series of concentric circles, with the Ministry at the very center and movement to outer circles signifying increasingly local levels of participation. Others donors orientations favored local participatory processes of knowledge production and utilization that privileged local stakeholders (and their own position) and marginalized state as well as global players. Their topography of the policy field would look more like nonconcentric circles defined by provinces, with the MINED existing within the Maputo province. Enhancing the relative importance of the local in the policy field legitimated their own organizational habitus and cultural capital while marginalizing both state and global players in the same way that enhancing the relative importance of the global privileged the World Bank and, enhancing the relative importance of the capital of Maputo privileged the MINED and the Mozambican state.

The organizational orientations toward knowledge production and utilization that key stakeholders brought to the policy field thus reflected the forms of capital and practices through which different organizations historically established their legitimacy (or not) in educational policy formation. This, in turn, influenced their assessment of MINED’s attempt to privilege policy dialogue for participation and organizational learning.

On Positions and Dispositions I: What the Strategic Plan Process Meant to the Ministry of Education
I have been interviewing people at the Ministry all week and it is not the place I remember. For one thing, I no longer have to get there at 7:30 in the morning in the hopes of catching someone before they leave for their next job. For another, I hear laughter in the hallways. People are busy, I see them running from one place to another, discussing reports and visits to schools. They actually seem excited about their work. The faces are familiar but I cannot escape the desire to say to the people I meet there, “Who are you and what have you done with the Ministry’s staff? (Fieldnotes, November 10, 1996).

The international partners generally acknowledged that the process of formulating a strategic plan heightened morale at the Ministry of Education but to really appreciate the difference in morale, one has to have a sense of how low it had fallen by the late eighties, when I had my first contact with the Ministry of Education. Increase in professional morale was unquestionably the most consistent issue raised by members of the Ministry working groups when asked to share their impressions of the ESSP process: it had given them pride in their work, confidence in their ability to solve problems, trust to admit when they needed assistance from colleagues or from external consultants, and a sense of camaraderie. Their focus was consistently on policy dialogue as internal knowledge production, participation and organizational learning, that is, on the (MINED) organization as field.

When I asked Mozambican members of the working groups why the Ministry had chosen this process for elaborating a strategic plan, they unanimously focused on the desire to gain ownership of knowledge production and utilization. Rather than focusing on the lack of capacity in the Ministry (a concern of some international partners, and a consistent theme in the ESSP documents), they spoke of the expertise they had developed over the years because of their work in research consultancies and because of the low institutional capacity of the Ministry. This had forced them to wear many hats, and they now viewed this as their strength.

We are a young country, but perhaps because of the realities of being at the point of departure, the nature of the education system itself and the country’s internal and external dynamics, the conditions in which we had to work obliged us to grow and to reflect on what it was that we were doing. (Maria de Fatima, personal interview, 1998)
I think it was our experience [that informed the process of elaborating the strategic plan] because we all work at various levels of intervention. We are involved with planning at the same time that we are executing. There are moments when I work very closely with [the department of] planning, to the point of physically locating myself there, and other moments when I am working more closely with program execution. This is not just something that I do, but is the experience of most people working in our central institutions, where people intervene at various levels of the process, from conception to execution. (Paula Mendonça, personal interview, 1998)

The Ministry personnel believed that they knew the sector. The process of dialogue had given them an opportunity to show their international partners they knew the sector and that they were willing to learn whatever they needed to in order to strengthen their institutional capacity. They viewed the process as an opportunity to “reconstruct or to bring together the human resources” that had become dispersed as a result of the weakening of institutional capacity by the structure of donor assistance over the last two decades (Buendia, personal interview, 1998). Several felt that the experience of Mozambican researchers had lacked legitimacy in the past because of the culture of contracting foreign consultants, even though, they argued, most of these consultants would not have been able to “produce” their “knowledge” without the “experience” of Ministry personnel.

And so our option was, instead of bringing in people from the outside to come and tell us what we should do with our education system in Mozambique, I think that we know the sector best, those of us who have already been working in the sector for many years. We have experience, we have many diagnostics and evaluations of the sector. [I]t is precisely because we see this as a program that the Ministry has to realize, we should be the ones to do the work (Paula Mendonça, personal interview, 1998)

It was a question of options, we have to grow and we have to learn to do this ourselves, and to think about what it is we are doing. Let us reflect and think, let us design this plan because we have learned doing external consultancies... we then had to explain all of this - what we did, where we have come from, where we are going - so that then other persons could rework it. (Maria de Fátima, personal interview, 1998)
An important outcome of gaining control over knowledge production is the ability to confer symbolic capital on those whose cultural capital had previously gone undervalued.

When I asked Ministry personnel how this process differed from other reform processes, rather than referring to the former centralized organizational culture of the Ministry, they referred to the sense of purpose they had experienced in earlier reform initiatives, and in particular to the sense of purpose and dedication they felt while working in Mozambique’s post-revolutionary reform initiatives (Searle 1981). While they noted the different historical and political contexts of these earlier initiatives, they felt that the continuous process of dialogue and team spirit engendered by the ESSP had renewed the sense of purpose that they had felt in those early post-independence years.

The Ministry personnel also believed that they had gained a great deal from their extended relationships with some international partners in the working groups. They noted that these partners, as well as many of the consultants, showed a real commitment to working with them, spending long hours side-by-side trying to hammer out different details of the plan.

The dialogue was open and very frank, there was never any sense of distrust, no one [of the international partners] ever came and said, now what you’re doing is wrong. They would enter into the discussions, offer their experience, then the team [working group] would evaluate it. If the group thought there was something worth exploring further, it was then the group’s decision. But they [the international partners] were around the table with us. No one ever came, and said, look, we are here now, we want to know what you’re doing and see that you correct it. It was really about participation. (Ernesto Muianga, personal interview, 1998).

The value placed upon internal participation and organizational learning influenced the relative importance that Ministry personnel placed upon certain forms of dialogue and knowledge utilization, and their assessments of the plan’s success. Dialogue with international partners--and by extension the relative position of MINED within the field--while important, was viewed as secondary to building an internal capacity for continuous reflection and knowledge production and utilization. Implicit in this was the belief that consultation with local stakeholders was something that could
only be done more extensively once the Ministry had developed the capacity to engage in this form of dialogue, and had gained sufficient symbolic capital to engage local stakeholders (used to negotiating with international donors) in these conversations.

**Of Positions and Dispositions II: What the ESSP Meant to International Partners and What they Learned**

The international partners acknowledged the Ministry’s *tour de force*. Most believed that the process of dialogue had either strengthened the relationship among international partners (when they believed those relations were always good), or improved these relations (if they characterized the relationship as tense or wary at the beginning of the process).

Most international partners supported the Ministry’s orientation to knowledge production and utilization as policy dialogue and organizational learning. These partners felt that “ownership with MINED [was] more important than short-term efficiency and perfect documents” (Andersson, 1998, 2). From their perspective, the Ministry’s herculean efforts helped dispel some of the distrust that some donors felt towards MINED at the beginning of the process. Moreover, these donors felt that after many months of constant meetings and working alongside colleagues in the Ministry, the process had built, not organizational relations but interpersonal ones. Several noted that information sharing had been greatly facilitated because, now that they knew their colleagues in the Ministry, they could more easily simply pick up the phone and call them to request their input on some educational matter. In other words, shifts in the dominant habitus of the field (due to the enhanced position of the MINED within the field) was changing figurational structures (Mouzelis 2007) (relations between actors from different organizations) that might eventually lead to changes in dispositions within organizations (the organization as field).

Given the importance that they gave to Ministry ownership, these partners did not equate their role in the dialogue with *equal participation* in knowledge production and utilization. Rather, they viewed their role as responding to and challenging the content of the plan, but always in response to the Ministry’s initiatives. As indications of the Ministry’s success in gaining ownership of the process, they pointed to the Minister’s
key role and constant presence, the exhaustive efforts of the Directorate of Planning to coordinate dialogue within the Ministry and between the donors, as well as the Ministry’s astuteness in its presentation of the Plan at the UNESCO meeting in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance. They regarded favorably the Minister’s insistence that appraisal and ongoing evaluation of the plan be a joint Ministry-international partners process.

This perception was not shared by all international partners, however. Some were more guided by a habitus of policy dialogue as persuasion. They tended to place a greater value on networking and the incorporation of as many knowledge agents as possible, and less on the Ministry’s ownership of the plan. Consequently, virtually all of the criteria that signaled a positive sense of Ministry ownership by other partners, they viewed as having stifled the process of consultation. These partners viewed the Plan’s joint construction by policymakers and technical assistants as one of its weaker points. They viewed knowledge as something that should be produced by one group (technical assistants) and consumed and prioritized by another (policymakers). They argued that the mixture of technical and policymakers dragged out the process because technical personnel did not always understand the complex political, economic and social context in which the reform should have been constructed. Moreover, they pointed out that, on the donor side, this resulted in very junior persons participating in discussions who often had no authority to make major policy initiatives on behalf of their government.

**Shifts in Positions Imply Shifts in Dispositions: The International Aid Complex as Learning Organizations**

In spite of such differences in assessments of the process, international partners unanimously noted that shifts in control over knowledge production to the MINED meant shifts in organizational dispositions across and within the international donor organizations that they had not foreseen. While international partners had viewed favorably the cultural capital that the MINED had acquired during the planning process, they confessed to having given little thought to what this would mean to their organizations’ own cultural capital and orientations to knowledge production and utilization (c.f. Andersson 1998; “Appraisal Report” 1998). Regardless of the
orientations to knowledge production and utilization that the these representatives said they brought to the process of dialogue with the Ministry, they were often beholden to a central organization whose accountability and financing structures were still embedded in orientation to knowledge production based upon policy dialogue as persuasion. This “cross-field interference” (Lingard et.al. 2005) from the bureaucratic and economic fields restricted the degree to which actors on the ground could substantively transform their practices in relation to the MINED as well as internally and caused a disjuncture between these organizations’ articulation and actual practice of their organizational habitus.

The World Bank’s “troubles” with some international partners reflects some of the challenges presented by these disjunctures. On the one hand, in theory, the World Bank’s official discourse strongly advocated that the Ministry of Education assume primary control over knowledge production of the ESSP by pushing for the MINED’s “ownership” of the process for the purposes of “building capacity” it presumed the MINED did not previously have. Indeed, the Bank utilized its own financial capital to fund institutional capacity building projects in the education sector. On the other, the Bank’s own internal practices and orientations to knowledge production and utilization (including the use of their own experts to assess the Plan’s feasibility and viability, and timing policy decisions around Board meetings) worked counter to their surrendering control of knowledge production and utilization in fact.

The Bank was not alone in having to consider how it might need to harmonize intraorganizational habitus with this shift in control of knowledge production and utilization to MINED. Peter Larsen (personal interview 1998) observed: “...[T]he devil lays in the details. We can all agree to the overall policies and program support instead of projects... But then when you have to implement, what does it mean? Donors will have to twist around their own rules and regulations probably under pressure from other donors so that’s also process and I think we also need to learn about that process. So there’s a lot of challenges ahead of us.”

Muriel Visser (1998), education sector manager for the Dutch Embassy recounted some of the contradictions and ironies resulting from this disjuncture:
In retrospect I think that in the dialogue between the donors or the partners and the Ministry of Education there should have been more attention ... [to donor support] and to making clear what our own limitations are with regard to providing sector support... I just came back from a meeting in the Netherlands in which we discussed for our Ministry ... the efforts that are being made to move into sector support and one of the comments that I raised there ... is that we have a whole set of criteria for the receiving country to comply with in order to be eligible for this kind of support, but I think we should also draw up a big list of these things for us also ... Because for example, all Dutch embassies work on an annual cycle whereas if you’re going to move into sector support you’re presupposing that you can actually make a commitment for the next five, seven, ten years and we’re not allowed to do that... So those are changes that our system has to make.... Here at the Maputo level, including myself, the people that are responsible for the education programs often don’t really have enough insight into the mechanisms required for moving into sector support. [I]f we had had some training from the beginning then we would have been more careful in paying attention to ... the procedure part... It is a bit ironic for me actually to be invited to participate in a workshop on sector support now, last month when actually I should have done it a year ago, but actually the Hague is two steps behind Mozambique at this moment in terms of the process.

These disjunctures between international organizations’ discourse about their commitment to increasing Ministry ownership over knowledge production and their own internal orientations and practices do not exist in a vacuum. Extant organizational dispositions and practices reflect extant positional structures of those organizations within the educational policy field, as well as cross-field effects from the economic and bureaucratic fields to which these organizations are also beholden. In particular, representatives of international organizations in Mozambique noted that the MINED’s control over knowledge production and utilization within the educational policy field would signal a move to non-earmarked funds and this would require a surrendering one of the major benefits accrued to the international aid complex in existing donor-recipient practices: procurement. Those representatives of international organizations who ultimately showed more willingness to orient their practices to complement those of MINED thus did so as relatively autonomous policy actors and not because the habitus of the organization they represented was more aligned with that of the MINED.
On the other hand, lapses in trust occurred among individual representatives who more faithfully embodied the tensions of positions and dispositions within the field. Rather than promoting transformative practices and orientations, these tensions tended to reproduce inequalities in symbolic capital that were counterproductive to relations of trust, collegiality and mutual ratification by reproducing international partners’ existing images of the Ministry’s capacity. One of the major obstacles to building trust was the ways in which knowledge was transmitted and reproduced within these organizations as field. As I asked international partners to construct their understanding of the historical genesis of the ESSP, there were times when it was difficult to surmise if they were speaking of the same process. Some of their historical accounts were sprinkled with rumors or urban legends, that is events, which, when I attempted to verify them, turned out not to have occurred, or to have been misrepresented. These rumors often had to do with key events surrounding the decision to elaborate a strategic plan, meetings held among certain partners with the Ministry, which organizations forced whom to do what, and why certain technical advisors left. While these “rumored” accounts appeared in only a few of the interviews, they were systematic within organizations, and tended to color their representatives overall perceptions of the motives and capacity of the Ministry and/or other international partners.

These perceptions and rumors appeared to be the result of the orientations to knowledge production and utilization within international aid organizations. The two to three-year rotation of personnel meant that very few of the persons interviewed had been involved in the process from start to finish, and so relied on briefings from their predecessors for their understanding of the process as a whole. This tended to influence the depth of institutional memory, and in some cases led to distorted information, particularly given the tendency for “information incest”: international partners tended to rely on fellow nationals, and on national information sources, for their views regarding the Ministry and other international partners. Representatives of organizations who chose to “buy into” the organizational “party line” in turn were less likely to reach out to the MINED personnel when they had questions. Organizational perceptions of their dominant position and their parochial orientations to knowledge production and utilization became mutually recursive. The more insular dominant groups (adopting
practices whereby they restrict knowledge production and utilization to those already within the organization), the less likely they may be to understand how innovation and change beyond their organization is possibly rendering their habitus irrelevant even as they reproduce it.

Control of Knowledge Production and Utilization in an Historical Context of International Donor Assistance: Bourdieu… and Beyond

The MINED’s attempt to legitimize its organizational cultural capital by engaging international and multinational actors within the policy field in a planning process designed to shift control of knowledge production and utilization to the Ministry-as Bourdieu might have noted--changed the rules but not necessarily the game. MINED’s orientation to knowledge production and utilization in the ESSP planning process had two goals: (1) to more favorably position the MINED within the global educational policy field, thereby increasing the relative exchange value of the MINED’s cultural as well as symbolic capital; and (2) to validate orientations and dispositions of knowledge production and utilization that had been historically valued and meaningful to MINED policy actors. MINED policy actors framed the ESSP planning process to be primarily about this second goal, that is, about the MINED as field.

One of the ways in which the MINED repositioned themselves was by shifting the locus of practice realization of knowledge production and utilization to Maputo and the MINED, thereby weakening the relative importance of both the global (the World Banks orientation) and the local (the international community’s orientation) as sites of policy realization. Its deployment of important embodiments of the state’s political and symbolic capital— the Minister of Education as well as the Minister of Finance in highly publicized events— helped the MINED enhance the value of these forms of capital in the eyes of the international as well as local communities. This was a necessary precursor if the MINED hoped to have sufficient political and cultural capital to impose their orientation to the process of knowledge production and utilization once the ESSP planning process moved beyond the capital.

We might be tempted to an overly triumphalist interpretation if we assume that in the short run the MINED’s ability to gain some relative autonomy with respect to
control over knowledge production and utilization resulted in significant shifts in the MINED’s over all position in the “field of power.” The question remains whether non-earmarked funds posed problems because of international accountability structures or international accountability structures and dispositions posed problems because of the call for non-earmarked funds.

It looks as though while individual international representatives were willing to cede control of the economic capital that in theory should have followed the Ministry’s greater control of the cultural capital informing knowledge production and utilization, the donor organizations they represented were weak in relation to global bureaucratic and political fields, which in turn continue to be rather impervious to contestations of their existing disposition and practices. None of this would have come as a shock to the MINED policy actors but if we end our analysis here, we miss some more subtle aspects of the MINED habitus and practices that are suggestive of the levels at which relatively marginalized organizations within a field may begin their ascent and shift the dominant habitus over time. By creating public rituals that demonstrated the coherence between policy-field, bureaucratic field, and economic field at the national level, the Mozambican government rendered visible not only its ability to build and sustain capacity but also the inability of the dominant organizations within the field to align their political, bureaucratic fields in a transformative way. Bourdieu might suggest that (a) dominant groups have no incentive to transform their orientations in ways that undermine their relative position of privilege, and (b) privileged groups have less need to “prove” that their cultural capital warrants their dominance. But there is another level of power at which the Ministry’s dispositions are important for understanding groups in relatively marginal positions: by rendering visible their capacity to control knowledge production in relation to dominant organizations within the field they undermine the symbolic violence (Lakomski 1984) of the myth of dominant groups’ omnipotence as well as the “cultural arbitraries” through which dominant groups try to sustain this violence. This forever changes the rules of the game because it makes apparent what the game actually is that everyone is playing. Indeed it is at the level of symbolic violence that dominant groups may begin to cede control of cultural capital.
The Mozambican case suggests some implications for our understanding of structure and agency, positions and dispositions. First and foremost, we ought not to confuse the impact of existing structures and positions on sense of relative autonomy with the impact of structures and positions on sense of agency. Sense of autonomy involves prognostication regarding what positions exist within the field and what opportunities exist to maneuver within the field. Sense of agency, on the other hand, is a cognitive disposition that is contextual and contingent, constitutive and constituted by a group’s sense of control over its valued symbolic and material resources (habitus) regardless of their exchange value within broader fields of power (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Cohen 1985). Cultural capital’s value not only derives from a community being able to impose its meaning; it also has intrinsic value for creating meaning. It is not that the impetus for innovation in habitus is always a reaction to some exogenous source (the “domination-resistance binary” that troubles post-critical scholars), but communities and groups with a long history of oppression and domination eventually develop practices and orientations that better help them secure agency to create meaning under those circumstances. Dominant groups can attempt to usurp dominated groups’ access to and control over their cultural capital, but this just means that dominated groups will find ways to inscribe old meaning to new practices or render certain practices invisible to dominant groups (Cohen 1985).

The ESSP process is an example of the kind of practices and orientations that can develop in circumstances of marginality. Two specific examples of dispositions and practices that Mozambicans developed are what I call opportunity cultural capital and positional cultural capital. Opportunity cultural capital refers to the ability to recognize openings in the dominant paradigm that would facilitate less dominant players reframing the habitus of the field, or at least gaining greater access to and control over their own cultural capital within the field. We might expect this to occur when the dominant framing discourse begins to lose its relevance. Such was the case of the dominant paradigm in international aid: the discourse of “underdevelopment” and “social disorder” have been discredited; a new discourse of “capacity-building” and partnerships have taken its place. But one cannot really be partners when only some have the power to declare which among them has capacity or not. Rather than contesting this shift in
discourse as unequal as the underdevelopment discourse, Mozambicans utilized the dominant discourse to their advantage.

Part of this opportunity cultural capital is shaped by the very consciousness of positions that marginalized actors within a field develop. There is a benefit to seeing privilege from its underside; one can observe just what it is that the marginal position is propping up in the dominant group. Postional capital facilitates one’s ability to see the relative dependence of the dominant group on one’s own marginalization. In the case of the ESSP, we see how Mozambique’s positional capital facilitated their leveraging the partners’ dependence on them. A joke told by Mozambicans was that they had to find a way to make the international community a part of their ESSP because otherwise just think how many foreigners would be out on Maputo’s streets begging for a handout. As the bidding wars among international donors suggests, domination tends to set up systems of mutual dependence that over time so-called dominated groups can learn to exploit.

If I were to use a game metaphor the Mozambican case suggests that habituses of domination – the disposition of privileged groups to maintain their privilege-- is akin to boxing where one gains dominance by overpowering and opposing the opponents’ strengths. On the other hand, the dispositions and practices of dominated elites to reposition themselves are more akin to jujitsu, where one gains dominance by using the opponent’s energies against them. The MINED leveraged international and multinational donors’ symbolic, economic and political capital to reposition themselves within the educational field.

The generative aspect of habitus is also better grasped when we consider how it is embodied and expressed by individual actors. Within any organization, two actors may be guided by similar orientations and yet manifest it in very different sets of practices. Policy actors representing international donor organizations varied in their personal dispositions and practices, with some being more willing and open to engaging with their MINED colleagues than others. Some international representatives were conspiring with their Mozambican counterparts to start bidding wars; others lamented having to participate in a process where so few of the participants had the technical expertise for strategic planning. As one moves from looking at organizations within a
field to looking at those same organizations as fields, the degree of relative autonomy of individual actors increases. This may be the very reason why international organizations set terms limits on their employee contracts: rotation every few years interrupts the influence of any particular policy actor(s) on the organizational habitus as whole.

While MINED representatives were focused on the MINED as a field, and acknowledged that the ESSP process was not going to significantly transform the fields of power of international development and global capital as these intersected with the education policy field, they believed that control over knowledge production and utilization strengthened the Ministry’s symbolic and political capital thereby legitimizing the cultural capital that MINED personnel already possessed. They attributed an intrinsic value to this relative autonomy over knowledge production that far superseded its potential exchange value in the policy field as a whole. Control over knowledge production and utilization meant the ability to produce and utilize knowledge through the collaborative, participatory and group processes that the Ministry had first developed after independence. The ESSP process had enabled them to return to orientations and dispositions that once again gave their work meaning by supporting feelings of solidarity, attunement and mutual ratification.

We could think of this as an increase in emotional capital (Reay 2005) and it came at a loss in terms of MINED employees’ economic capital because many of them were now doing for their paltry MINED salary what in the past they were getting paid lucrative fees to do as consultants to international and multinational donor organizations. In a similar fashion, donor organization representatives who sought out collegiality, collaboration and, in some cases, collusion with their MINED counterparts were not behaving in ways that can be easily explained in terms of benefits to their political, economic or symbolic capital within their organizations. In their case also, they also seemed motivated by a desire for emotional capital, in the form of solidarity, mutual attunement, and sense of helpfulness that often put them at odds with the dispositions of the very organizations for which they worked.

There might be a way of calculating how this emotional capital that colleagues exchanged with each other might have translated into greater cultural capital or productivity (economic or political capital) across and within organizations but this is
the point where perhaps Bourdieu’s post-critical colleagues may be on to something when they ask if domination and resistance is all there is. As Scheurich (1997) observes

Our social life… is riddled with dominance and inequity … But to enclose social life within the dominant resistance binary is but another prison house of language, meaning and communication. Much of living… occurs outside the confines of the dominance-resistance binary. People work with horses, grow plants… They write poetry… and raise children. They not only pursue the wild profusion; they are the wild profusion (72).

The habituses of the fields with which our lives intersect may define or frame the material, symbolic and embodied “world of meaning” (Avruch & Scimecca 1992) through which we make sense of and give expression to our wild profusion of individual and collectives practices—and to this degree structures “restrict/determine” orientations and practices. But they are wildly profuse practices nonetheless, and the source of the creativity and innovation of which Bourdieu believed human actors capable, even if he perhaps he gave greater importance to self-reflection in processes of practical innovation that Scheurich suggests. Wild profusion may not be the result of reflection as much as it is a testimony to the Pandora’s box of complexity we unleash once we surrender belief in human actors as rational ones—a project to which Bourdieu’s work greatly contributed. We are thus left with human actors as reasoning actors whose emotional world may lead them to maximize certain material, symbolic, embodied experiences but not necessarily for their value as exchange capital for meaning imposition, but for their intrinsic value for meaning creation.

By virtue of the fact that it constitutes a capital and therefore a value, emotional capital may not only have power to inspire innovation, creativity and resilience, but also the power to be instrumentalized by dominant groups. In thinking about the Mozambican case study, and what it suggests regarding the educational policy field and its intersection with the international development and global capital fields we might see a parallel with Freeman Butts’ (1976) observation of colonialism as a “potent elixir”.

The modern imperialist fervor of the late nineteenth century was a potent elixir. It was brewed with a base of religious and humanitarian zeal planted by the earlier civilizing mission now in full flower, reinforced with the acquisitive desire for economic gain…. Backed up by the military might of
powerful navies and armies, inspired with the pride and prestige of a competitive nationalism, and topped off with the heady adventuresomeness to be gained from travel and daring-do in far-off places. The more critical analysts of imperialism from JA Hobson to Lenin have made of it an image of unrelieved aggression by greedy capitalists… That the economic motivation was present cannot be denied, but the Marxist-Leninist portrayal… underplays the sense of mission that motivated vast reaches of the Western peoples, without which the conniving of a few capitalists or political leaders would have been relatively fruitless. (523)

Butts’ understanding of the emotional capital cultivated in the “civilizing mission” of the 19th and 20th century in countries such as Mozambique suggests that habituses (such as the one legitimated by the global colonial field) constitute and are constituted by values and dispositions that carry emotional content. Some of the most potent emotional content reinforces feeling of helpfulness and adventure, a “potent elixir,” from which many different and sometimes contradictory practices and relations emerge between so-called dominated and dominant groups. Parallel to relations of domination, studies of Mozambique’s colonial educational field have documented very similar types of relations of collegiality, collaboration and collusion between Mozambicans and representatives of international colonial organizations to those found during the ESSP process (Cross1987; author 1993, 1996, 2004). Over time, the combination of Mozambican practices of resistance, and the part of the “potent elixir” that fostered relations of collegiality, collaboration and collusion undermined the dominant colonial ruling elite. What we may be witnessing with the ESSP, therefore, may not be so much a new struggle but a manifestation at one point in time of the ongoing struggles for control over cultural capital across and within fields to tip the forces of that “potent elixir” toward, innovation, autonomy, agency, and meaningfulness.

Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural and power may itself be a potent elixir, drawing in new generations of scholars excavating new insights and orientations to our understanding of culture and power from Bourdieu’s own scholarly practices and dispositions. This was of course, Bourdieu’s point. What he perhaps underestimated is how much such innovation in habitus might be driven by desire and our search for meaning through culture—dominant or not—even, perhaps especially, in perilous times.
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