Argumentation in Religious Education- An Analysis on German Islamic Religion Textbooks

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Abstract

Argumentation is a rational method used in all areas of life, including education, to solve a problem, dispute or conflict. Our study is based on a discursive textual analysis of the use and possibilities of argumentation in religious education and our aim is to interpret the argumentation used in religious education through Habermas' model. For this purpose, we have analysed various texts selected from Islamic religion textbooks taught in Germany at primary, secondary and high school level. Our main finding is that Habermasian argumentation is successfully used in the textbooks in current events, whereas it is used in a "limited" and "conditional" way about historical interpretations. The main factor determining the boundary of argumentation is the requirements of the Islamic faith. The limit refers to the cessation of argumentation after a certain point. The condition, on the other hand, refers to the fact that a solution to the dispute can only be found by showing loyalty to a sacred source.

Keywords: *Habermas, argumentation, disagreement, compromise, religion textbook, Islamic religious education, boundary, condition*

Introduction and problem

Over the last thirty years, the question of whether and how Islam can be taught in German public schools has been the subject of intense public debate (Sarikaya, 2011: 113). These discussions yielded positive results and concrete

steps began to be taken. Starting in 1999-2000, negotiations between state governments and religious communities led to pilot studies, curricula and textbooks being developed in many states. Islamic studies was finally officially introduced as an independent subject in primary and secondary schools in 2012 (Bartsch, 2022). So the teaching of Islam as a religion for Muslim students in German public schools is a relatively new idea (Knight, 2018) and Islam has been taught as an independent subject since 2012 (Ucar, 2019: 16). A political step to realize this idea was very effective. In 2007, the Federal Ministry of the Interior established the German Islamic Conference (DIK), which was to serve as a platform for dialogue between the German government and Muslims to discuss, among other things, the introduction of Islamic religious education in public schools. Later, the process matured and the subject was included in the curricula. In North Rhine-Westphalia, which took the lead in this regard, there was an Islamic religion course for Muslim-Turkish pupils in basic schools from the 1987/88 school year, but it was not independent and was offered at the request of parents and pupils as part of "Complementary Lessons in the Mother Tongue" (Gebauer, 2002: 263).

In Germany, Islamic knowledge and values were first transmitted to children through informal socialization. In the 1960s and 1970s, Muslims with a migration background in the country tried to pass on their Islamic traditions to their children in their homes or in classes temporarily organized by laypeople. However, the religious knowledge of both parents and laypeople was minimal, as most of those who provided such instruction belonged to the lower classes who had no significant religious education in their countries of origin (Yaşar, 2013: 127). From the 1970s onwards, therefore, the demand for a more systematic Islamic religious education in primary, secondary and high schools was more frequently raised by communities, which increasingly organized themselves into umbrella organizations. For decades, Islamic associations have

worked in partnership with state governments to ensure that Islamic education, similar to Catholic and Protestant education, is provided in public schools (Yaşar, 2013: 129-130). This is because Article 7 of the German constitution, which regulates the school regime, gives religious communities a role and mandate in religious education. However, the state has the right to supervise the content of religious education in public schools in terms of its constitutionality. Religious communities are ultimately responsible for the religious content of the course, and the secular state is not allowed to interfere. Nevertheless, although education is a matter of state policy, each state government is free to determine its own plans for religious education in public schools (Yaşar, 2013: 132). Muslims, however, support the integration of Islam into the education system (Yaşar, 2013: 125).

The introduction of Islamic religious education into the German public education system is a recent phenomenon and the result of several developments. Four factors contributed to the introduction of the course into the curriculum: First, the legal situation (exercise of constitutional rights and guarantees), second, parental demand in line with the growing Islamic youth population (demographic demand), third, the inadequacy of informal Islamic religious education (demand for formal education), and fourth, the expectation of integration and cohesion (integration into the system). First, Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of Germany recognizes the right to religious freedom. Article 7 regulates the school education regime and the only subject explicitly mentioned in this article is religious education (Rothgangel, 2011: 119). Although the German state is secular, its attitude towards religion is supportive. The opportunity for religious education provided by the German Federal Constitution is protected by the state as a constitutional right and guarantee. Religious education as part of the public school system is provided in conformity with the fundamental principles of religious communities, without

prejudice to the state's right of control. The 'dual responsibility' of the state and religious communities for religious education is based on a 'mutual agreement' that binds both parties to this task (Simon, 2000). Therefore, the state and religious communities work together on this subject. According to Article 7 of the German Constitution, Muslims, like Christians, have the right to have their children receive religious education under the supervision of the state (Mende, 2008). This right has been recognized at the official level, i.e. by the government, and this recognition has been openly declared. For example, Federal Interior Minister Horst Seehofer has declared that Muslims have the same rights and obligations as all citizens of this country ((Loho, 2020). The first reason for the introduction of Islamic religious education into the German public education system is therefore the exercise of this constitutional right and guarantee. The exercise of the right includes an assurance that the constitutional rules must be respected. This guarantee is given both by the state (federal and state governments) and by religious communities.

The second reason is the demand for religious education in schools for the younger generations within the growing Islamic population in Germany. The Muslim population in the country reached 5.5 million in 2019 (6.6% of the general population) (Pfündel, Stichs, Tanis, 2020). Islam has thus become Germany's third largest established religion, increasingly gaining official acceptance. The fact that 21% of the country's Muslim population is under the age of 15 and 22% between the ages of 15 and 24 indicates that almost half of the Islamic population is young and of school age (Loho, 2020). Consequently, parents' demand for this course has been quite high. However, more than half of these young people were unable to attend religious education and ethics classes in schools due to "insufficient provision" (Haug, Müssig, Stichs 2009: 18). Consequently, experts say there is a need for more religion classes in German schools. According to Rauf Ceylan, professor of contemporary Islamic studies

at the University of Osnabrück, the number of Muslim students between the ages of 6 and 18 in German schools is around 750-800 thousand, although exact numbers are not known (Knight, 2018).

The third reason is that the religious education provided by the Islamic communities themselves has been criticized and deemed inadequate by the state governments and some Islamic religious scholars. Indeed, there have been many criticisms of the Islamic religious education provided in mosques and Quran courses: Students memorizing passages from the Qur'an without critical interpretation, instilling extremist attitudes in students, etc. In fact, the problem is more general and inclusive. According to Rausch, in response to the extremist efforts of radical Muslim groups, which have negatively affected the processes of integration and adaptation, other Muslims have sought to respond by creating educational institutions that foster dialogue and civic engagement within and beyond their own communities (Rausch, 2003: 24). Religious education at school is therefore seen as the most appropriate institution for cohesion, integration and adaptation. Shifting this education from informal and unsupervised areas to formal and supervised, systematic institutional areas have been a general expectation of experts on the subject. For example, according to Rauf Ceylan, professor of contemporary Islamic studies at the University of Osnabrück, there are three pillars of Islamic religious education in Germany: The family, which remains vague on the subject; the mosques, which merely pass on the faith; and the schools, whose main idea is to educate students for religious maturity. According to Ceylan, the aim of Islamic education cannot be simply or solely to learn to interpret the Qur'an; on the contrary, one should be taught to think critically about the Qur'an. For him, Islamic religious education is "about learning the skills of organizing and analyzing religious content and comparing religions, which is important as we live in a multi-religious society with atheists and agnostics" (Loho, 2020). Critics of informal Islamic religious

education argue that this type of teaching is not compatible with developing responsibility and independent thinking in children (Mende, 2008). For these reasons, in March 2008, the German Conference on Islam, chaired by Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, called for comprehensive teaching of Islam in the German language in public schools, where education experts argued that teaching Islam by teachers trained at German universities would serve to improve integration (Mende, 2008). For this purpose, since 2011, a large number of prospective teachers of Islamic religious education have been trained in Germany at Islamic theological centers in Tübingen, Frankfurt, Münster, Osnabrück and Erlangen-Nürnberg.

Therefore, the fourth reason for the introduction of this subject in the curricula is the expectation that in the long run, the teaching of Islam can foster dialogue and lead to better religious/socio-political integration and a better coexistence of all people living in the country (Haug, Müssig ve Stichs, 2009: 4). The reality behind this need and demand for dialogue is the increasing diversification of religion. According to Martin Rothgangel, an evangelical scholar of religious education in secular Germany, this diversity poses particular challenges for religious education in schools. Although the population is predominantly Christian, almost half of the students in Hamburg, for example, have a migration background, with 250,000 foreigners from 185 different countries living in the city (Rothgangel, 2011). Even if the demand for religious education in school by these diverse communities with different religious backgrounds is accepted, the problem arises afterwards: How should this instruction be provided without contradicting or conflicting with the values of secular democratic Germany? What role can Islamic religious education play in integrating Muslims into the secular German system? Or rather, can these courses play this role?

The German federal state and state governments hope that this opportunity, which Muslim citizens use within the framework of their constitutional rights, will also strengthen integration (Yaşar, 2013: 125). However, the introduction of Islam into the pedagogical system has raised the didactic question of how religious knowledge can be taught without contradicting secular/democratic life (Aslan and Rausch, 2003). To a large extent, this question also concerns how religion textbooks can be designed. The aim of this design is to ensure the integration of the student as a Muslim subject into the Western democratic system. In this context, the aim of Islamic religious education in Germany is not the construction of a Muslim community on the basis of identity politics, but rather the formation of a reflexive (*reflektierenden*) critical individual and his/her behavioural competencies (Spenlen, 2018) and to enable students to think critically about the information they receive (Yaşar, 2013). One of the pedagogical and didactic methods that can be used for Muslim students to acquire a reflexive, critical and interpretive competence in Islamic religious studies can be argumentation. Moreover, the argumentation method has been used as an important didactic tool in the pedagogical systems of some Western countries in recent years, including Germany, England and many others (Andrews, 2009; Boero, 2011; Burkard et al., 2021; Chan, Fancourt and Guilfoyle, 2020; Monte-Sano, 2016). Habermas, who put this method on a comprehensive and critical philosophical basis in the Western literature, provided an important opening by arguing that a traditional form such as religion should be handled on an argumentative basis in order to play a democratic role in secular life (Habermas, 2016).

So the subject of this article is to determine, with reference to Habermas' approach, whether the argumentation method is used in the resolution of disputes and disagreements in the texts presented in the books of Islamic religion courses taught at all levels of the German education system. Although

Islamic religion classes meet the demands of the post-secular society[i] as a meaningful formal example of the intertwining of the religious and the secular in terms of the representation and integration of the "other" into the system, there are epistemological and pedagogical/didactic problems in Islamic religion textbooks. For example, the fact that argumentation is cut off after a certain point with traditional fidelity points to a limit. The article considers the Habermasian philosophy of argumentation as a reflexive and didactic method for democratic valorisation, but positions it against traditional loyalty (the limit) and the acceptance of sacred authority as the ultimate authority (the condition) in Islamic religious textbooks. This should be taken as normal given the dogmatic character of the field of religion, because the dictates of dogmatic religious teachings can come into logical conflict with the methodological approaches required for thinking on a scientific level, since the argumentative way of thinking plays a role in the search for truth in opposition to the principles of monopoly, absoluteness and immutability. Religion, while claiming a monopoly on truth, hardly recognizes that there can be different perspectives, that different positions can be taken on events, and that life can be viewed from different windows. The Enlightenment tradition replaced religious belief with reason, arguing that there are many possibilities and variables in life. This led to the questioning of any conception of truth in the scientific field, which is based on criticism, interpretation and evaluation. The Western pluralist conception of society was based on the self-reflexive, argumantative and critical approach of individuals to generate different options and choose the most rational of them. Habermas argues that in order to overcome this contradiction, religion should be as argumentative as possible in order to reconcile with the requirements of secular life. In this article, we analyze the extent to which Habermas' expectations are met in Islamic religion textbooks through some texts.

Importance of argumentation and literature review in education

According to Habermas, argumentation also plays an important role in learning processes (Habermas, 2004: 18) because argumentation as an "instructional method" (Hacıeminoğlu & Yıldız, 2002) enables students to acquire various cognitive/didactic skills (awareness and motivation skills, epistemological practice skills, reason and evidence-based thinking, etc.). As such, argumentative skills are a systematic framework for teaching and learning (Burkard et al., 2021). Argumentation enables the learner to reason systematically, efficiently and critically about any topic, and to think rationally on the basis of different and competing arguments. Therefore, argumentation is also considered as an important epistemological exercise that enables students to access a skill set through formal school education (Wolfe, 2011). Learning argumentation can clarify the distinctive feature of a particular topic in terms of how knowledge is justified and grounded, what counts as evidence, and demonstrate general argumentation skills that can be applied outside the confines of the classroom (Guilfoyle, Hillier and Fancourt, 2021).

Through argumentation, students can be helped to learn procedures to deal with challenging issues (Hacıeminoğlu & Yıldız, 2002). Students can learn controversial issues through argumentation. Argumentation is an important skill for a democratic society and can develop lesson-oriented literacy, critically literate citizenship and a deep understanding of the disciplines studied; therefore, it can be embedded in various school subjects (Guilfoyle, Hillier and Fancourt, 2021; European Union, 2006; Monte-Sano, 2016). The importance of argumentation in education can be evaluated from various perspectives such as teacher-student interaction in the classroom, student academic achievement, and productive classroom environment. For example, taking Habermas' notion of communicative rationality as a reference point for organising educational activities and assessing students' "educationalness" in the classroom

environment, Han (2002) argues that communicative acts are forms of argumentation that assert certain types of validity about what teachers teach and learn.

Argumentation, which is a method of justifying claims by showing reasons and evidence, has attracted the attention of educators all over the world in recent years (Hacıeminoğlu & Yıldız, 2002; Erduran, 2020). Studies have focused on how argumentation can increase course efficiency and academic achievement. A few examples can be given here. A study conducted in secondary schools in the London area between 1999 and 2001 found that science teachers made a significant improvement after using the argumentation method in their classrooms (Osborne et al., 2016). Another study in the field of science education investigated students' conceptualizations of the nature of science and how they interpret and evaluate conflicting evidence on a socioscientific issue. Accordingly, 84 high school students were asked to read conflicting reports on the status of global warming in order to elicit their opinions about the research objective. For this purpose, the students were asked to answer the questions given to them. The findings suggest that the interpretation and evaluation of contradictory evidence in a socioscientific context is influenced by various factors related to the nature of science, such as the interpretation of data and social interactions, including individuals' personal beliefs and expressions of their scientific knowledge (Sadler, Chambers, & Zeidler, 2007). This two-stage study, also conducted in London area secondary schools between 1999 and 2001, examined the development of argumentation in teachers and students. In the first phase, 12 science teachers were recruited and videotaped to record how they developed sets of materials and strategies to support argumentation in their classrooms. The aim of the study was to support and evaluate the development of teachers in teaching argumentation. Analysis of the data showed a significant improvement in the use of argumentation by the majority of teachers over the

year. In the second phase, the teachers taught at least 9 lessons involving socioscientific or scientific argumentation to their students in the experimental group. The aim was to evaluate the progress in students' argumentation skills in comparison with the control group. The findings show an improvement in the quality of students' argumentation throughout the course (Osborne, Erduran, & Simon, 2004). Sadler's study documented the argumentation-related perceptions and abilities of pre-service teachers who participated in a science course designed to encourage discourse and argumentation. According to the findings, participants viewed argumentation as a central element of science and a tool to promote conceptual development in science classrooms. The pre-service teacher participants were skilled in constructing arguments, especially in supporting their claims with evidence, and improved their practice as the course progressed (Sadler, 2006). In a quasi-empirical study of knowledge construction through successive activities on a controversial topic, Schwarz found that 120 fifth graders participated in successive discussion activities, some individually and some collectively. According to the methodology developed by Schwarz, the construction of knowledge was measured through the arguments/consequences produced. The study developed tools to assess changes in individual and collective arguments. The study showed that argumentation activities had a beneficial impact on collective and individual arguments and conclusions. Another finding was that individual students only partially internalized the collectively constructed arguments (Schwarz, 2003). A study examining the effect of classroom-based argumentation on high school students' argumentation skills, informal reasoning, and conceptual understanding of genetics examined the effect of argumentation by considering two groups in a primary school as the argumentation group and the comparison group. After attending professional development, the argumentation group teacher taught students argumentation skills in a 50-minute lesson. The findings showed that the argumentation group had a significant improvement in the complexity and quality of their arguments

compared to the comparison group (Venville and Dawson 2010). The analysis of this study, which investigated how science teacher candidates engaged in discussions about conformational analysis, showed that high-performing groups had multiple rebuttals to their arguments, and low-performing groups had problems assessing the reliability of their evidence (Pabuccu and Erduran, 2017). In another study, it has been found that teachers supported the development of components of rationality in students by asking different types of questions (Conner, 2017). Some researchers pointed out the importance of collective mathematical argumentation (Zhuang and Conner, 2020) and school governance (Mabovula, 2010). Cramer investigated on why logical games support argumentation (Cramer, 2014). However, argumentation has been much less researched in religious education than in science education (Guilfoyle, Hillier and Fancourt, 2021). Nevertheless, there are examples of argumentation in religion. In the UK, for example, argumentation is a strong aspect of many religious education curriculum documents as students are asked to analyse and evaluate different truth claims about faith and morality and are expected to give reasoned responses (Chan, Fancourt, and Guilfoyle, 2020 as cited in Guilfoyle, Hillier and Fancourt, 2021).

In general, the benefits of using argumentation in religious education and the analysis of religious texts (e.g. Hacıeminoğlu and Yıldız, 2002; Rashid, 2002; Guilfoyle, Hillier and Fancourt, 2021) as well as in philosophy and ethics courses (e.g. Burkard et al., 2021) have been emphasised. However, all of these studies are studies of how argumentation can be used more rationally to increase teacher and student effectiveness, impact and skill. In other words, they are analytical and empirical studies. But, how the argumentation model is used to articulate truth claims and resolve disputes in religious education texts has not been addressed. Our study, based on Habermas' approach expresses the problems faced by the argumentation model used in religious texts with the

"boundary" and "condition" factors, as well as drawing attention to the contradictions between argumentation and religious reasoning.

Habermas' argumentation model

Habermas's argumentation model reveals the possibilities of rational agreement and consensus on the basis of communicative reason (Habermas, 2004), the discursive product of intersubjective interaction. Subjects who communicate by assuming that their interlocutors are rational (Habermas, 2016: 28; Boero, 2011: 189-190) focus on the truth claims they make by assuming a common objective world, that is the unconditional validity of their own statements (Habermas, 2016: 36), and try to get their arguments accepted as true and gain approval on the basis of consensus. However, for this they force their interlocutors to move out of the centre of their interpretive perspective. For argumentation to take place, subjects must also be able to refer to something in the objective world in which they are situated (Habermas, 2016: 30). Making a validity claim that is not in principle exempt from critical scrutiny is a critical and open-ended process of argumentation (Cooke, 1997: 30). Interlocutors submit to the force of the better argument that is independent of other inconvenient factors in order to reach an agreement on the truth or invalidity of their problematic claim. Validity claims also depend on reasons and foundations (Habermas, 2004: 301). For "shared meanings are based on shared reasons" (Finlayson, 2007: 65). Every speaker claims to have good reasons to convince his interlocutor of the validity of his words. The endeavour to reason and prove the truth of their claims is then an appropriate communication procedure that the speaker should follow (Brookfield, 2012: 131). For Habermas, argumentation is a process and form of discussion based on proof on the basis of reasoning. Therefore, the subject who engages in communication and performs an act of speech makes universal truth claims and assumes that they can be justified. Truth claims are assumptions that we always make unquestioningly about the truth and sincerity

of another's communication (Fleming, 2012: 118). According to Habermas, the subject's attempt to justify what he or she means actually involves an act of argumentative justification that his or her argument is true, justified or genuine. For an argument to take a valid position requires a process of rational consensus. According to Han, rational consensus is the ultimate criterion of truth; the resolution of truth claims depends on argumentative reasoning, not on experiences of certainty or linguistic correspondence with a bare reality (Han, 2002: 152).

Although Habermas sees religion as a serious problematic for rational argumentation, he thinks that statements that are irrational, problematic or contradictory have a positive function, at least in terms of provoking questioning (Habermas, 2016: 36). Even if subjects think that the claims of their interlocutors are not rational, they do not stop communicating, thinking that they are acting on grounds that are attempted to be rationally legitimised (Habermas, 2016: 38). Therefore, according to Habermas, it is necessary to deal with religion without losing critical distance from it. However, reason should not be closed to the perspective offered by religion. Religion is an important source of truth for modern society, as the valuable semantic insights it contains have not yet been exhausted by philosophy. To a certain extent, religious truths can be translated into discursive arguments and can be functional in strengthening democracy (Habermas, 2016). However, if religious motives are left unbridled without modification within institutional politics, the political community is in constant danger of unravelling in religious conflicts (Habermas, 2009: 135). On the other hand, when religions make truth claims, religious tradition, vocabulary and logic cannot function as a truth claim in debates. In other words, on the one hand Habermas wants to prevent religious truth claims from dominating the secular sphere, and on the other hand he demands that religious intuitions be translated into secular language. However,

Habermas also avoids the rationalist argument that would decide for religious doctrines what is rational and what is irrational. Thus, although he believes that religious language and imagination can claim and communicate a truth, what Habermas seeks in religion are moral insights and intuitions (Chambers, 2007: 212).

Habermas' model of argumentation provides an opportunity for the analysis of the problematic in our study in that it articulates the problematic aspects of religious truth claims for the secular sphere. We have hypothesised that argumentation in Islamic religious textbooks in Germany may experience a conflict at the point Habermas indicates and analysed this through sample texts. Accordingly, although Islam includes argumentation it partially prevents argumentation from evolving into an ethics of discourse and moving to an ideal state of communication because it recommends loyalty to sacred/secular authority.

Method

We have tried to answer the following three basic questions: What is the problem causing the dispute? How is this problem solved? At which points is the use of the argumentation model interrupted? In order to answer these questions, we used the "Critical Discourse Analysis" (CDA) method. One of the eight basic principles of CDA is that discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory (Rogers, 2004:2). What is interpreted and explained is the "discourse" known as a text in context, and discourse is seen as necessary and obligatory data for empirical analysis (Van Dijk, 1977: 3). Fairclough sees discourse as broader than text (Fairclough, 1992: 27). Therefore, discourse is a framework based on the expression of the meaning constructed through language in the text with various messages, values and rules. In our study, in order to reveal, explain and interpret this framework, we first summarised each

event/case selected from the Islamic religion textbooks on the basis of text and presented the problem, and then we analysed the text on the basis of discourse by considering the framework of the event subject to argumentation through Habermasian seven categories.

Table: Habermasian categories of argumentation (Habermas 1990; Habermas 1998; Habermas 2005; Habermas 2009; Habermas 2016)

1-Rational assumption	Recognition by each person that the other person behaves rationally as a prerequisite for the start of communication.
2-Reference to the objective world	Each person in the dialogue refers to the common thing (person, object, idea, etc.) that is the subject of the dispute.
3-To be convinced to provide justification	Being convinced that one's argument is rational, best and solution-orientated and trying to convince the other party of this.
4-Principle of universalisation	The generalisation of a particular perspective, i.e. the acceptance by all of the consequences that the fulfilment of particular interests can have when a norm is observed in order for it to be valid.
5-Rational discourse	The use of consensual rational discourse in the argumentation process, which is necessary for the formation of an "ethics of discourse" (universal normative framework).
6-Validity claims	Arguments/evidences that are claimed to be true, justified or fair
7-Ideal Speech Situation	A consensual communicative environment that enables argumentation to emerge and persist

In the first stage of the analysis, we randomly sampled 9 different Islamic religion textbooks taught in primary and secondary schools in Germany and analysed texts from these books that were suitable for the study. We interpreted the argumentation used by the textbook authors in proposing solutions to the dispute in a total of 7 cases through Habermas' model and expressed the two main problems that emerged with the concepts of "boundary" and "condition".

Example Cases

1) The reconciling authority of the prophet Muhammad

In Mecca, the Kaaba building was damaged by a great flood (Khorchide, Yilmaz, and Döbber, 2015: 35). The building has to be rebuilt. This work is shared by the members of the most powerful tribe of Mecca (Quraysh), so that everyone participates equally in this important task. However, at the end of the work, when it comes to the placement of the sacred "black stone" in the Ka'bah, disagreement arises as to who should place the stone. Each member wants to do this honourable and sacred task himself. When the disagreement could not be resolved, one person put forward a suggestion and it was accepted by the group. The suggestion is as follows: "Let's ask whoever comes here in a moment, let him decide and we will follow that decision" (p. 35). At that moment someone appears on the scene. Everyone in the group shouts with joy because it is the "trustworthy" prophet Muhammad. The situation is explained to Mohammed, who says, "Bring me a rug". He spreads the rug on the ground, has the black stone placed on the rug and asks each person in the group to hold one end of the rug and place the black stone together, which is done and finally "everyone is happy with this beautiful solution" (p. 35).

2) Resolving the dispute with the advice of the sage

This story (Kaddor, Müller, & Behr, 2017: 14-15) is about a dispute between a farmer and a shepherd. A shepherd's sheep enter a farmer's corn field and crush the seeds. The farmer thinks that he will no longer be able to sell his product and a dispute arises between the farmer and the shepherd. When the farmer and the shepherd cannot agree among themselves they go to Dāud, the ruler of the area, because he is the just king and messenger of God who has wisdom and power. The people trust his judgement. Dāud decides that the sheep must be given to the owner of the cornfield as punishment. The shepherd's son objects, saying that the field is still there, but only one year's crop has been ruined. The

problem is not solved, so Solomon intervenes and proposes the following: "Let the owner of the flock work in the field for one year and let the farmer look after the sheep in the meantime. After one year, the flock should be returned to its owner. Dāud sees how much wisdom has been given to Solomon by God and accepts his proposal" (pp. 14-15) According to the author of the textbook, justice is related to wisdom (pp. 14-15) and Solomon's suggestion is a wise and fair suggestion. The students are also asked to read the surah in the Qur'an in relation to this.

3) Dispute between father and daughter

In this incident (Ucar, 2012:41) we observe a discussion or dialogue between a Muslim father and his daughter. Amine tells her father that her classmate Tarık cannot find any information about polar bears in the Qur'an. The father laughs and says that not everything is written in the Koran. And he says: "I can imagine what would have happened to our Prophet Muhammad if the angel Gabriel had told him about polar bears. Polar bears in the desert!" (p. 41). In short, the father says that not everything is written in the Qur'an, that this book is only about the rules, duties and instructions that God has revealed to human beings. And he adds: "If they stick to it, they will be on God's right path" (p. 41).

4) Discussion in religion class

There is a discussion in the Islamic religion class (Ceylan, 2017: 21): The teacher says that Muslims should make judgements not only according to the Qur'an but also according to the Sunnah (the Prophet's words and behaviour). According to him, the Sunnah is the Prophet's way of life, which means that he is a role model for Muslims. One of the students, Berkan, says that he does not know how true this is and how the Prophet can be a role model for him. Emine says that it is written in the Qur'an that the Prophet is a role model. Berkan said: "But he lived very differently from me and I have completely different problems

today" (p. 21). When the teacher asks what exactly he means, Berkan tells about his problem with Mirko: Mirko wants to come to his football training but his friends don't want him. Berkan asks what he should do in this situation. He explains that if he did not take Mirko with him, he would be upset, but if he did, he would be stressed with his friends. And he asks: "The Prophet cannot help me in this matter" (p. 21). The students in the class think about this. Ömer says that the prophet was always friendly to people, never let anyone down and always helped people who had a problem. That is why he was a role model. Melissa says that in this case, what the prophet did and said can be considered. In the explanations part, students are asked to talk about what Berkan thinks about. They are also asked to write on the board what the prophet's advice to Berkan might be. The last question asks where the prophet can be a role model for students.

5) The unravelling of Yusuf's drama

In the text "Yusuf the Prophet" (Khorchide, 2012: 66-71), Yusuf lives near Jerusalem with his father, the prophet Yakup, and his eleven brothers. His brothers are jealous of Yusuf because they claim that their father loves Yusuf more than they do. Jealous, the brothers discuss how to teach Yusuf a lesson; some talk of killing him, others of throwing him into a well. Finally, they throw Yusuf into a well and tell their father that a wolf ate him in the field. The father is very sad about Yusuf's death. Yusuf is worried in the well, but he trusts in Allah. People in a passing caravan find Yusuf and take him out of the well, but they take him to Egypt and sell him as a slave to a rich man and his wife. Yusuf is a wise and good man. However, the woman of the house where Yusuf serves as a slave accuses him falsely of a job he had done at home and Yusuf is thrown into prison without charge. While in prison, he interprets the dreams of the prisoners. One day Pharaoh has a strange dream that no one can interpret what it means. Pharaoh's servant, who had been in the same prison as Yusuf,

remembered Yusuf and told him about the dream Pharaoh had had. Yusuf interprets the dream. Hearing this interpretation, Pharaoh summons him to his presence and makes him a minister. Yusuf interpreted the dream and said to Pharaoh: "The first seven years will be abundance, but the next seven years will be famine. You must build granaries to stock up for the years of famine." Pharaoh does as Yusuf says. When the years of famine come, Egypt does not starve, but the neighbouring countries suffer. Yusuf's family in Jerusalem did not have enough to eat. So Yusuf's brothers go to Egypt to buy grain. Yusuf recognises his brothers, but they do not recognise him. Yusuf gives them wheat. The third time his brothers come to Egypt to buy grain, Yusuf tells them that he is their brother. Finally, the brothers bring their old father to Egypt. Yusuf and his father are very happy to see each other again. Yusuf forgives his brothers. This historical story in the Bible and the Qur'an is also told in other books (Erkan, Lubig-Fohsel, Solgun-Kaps, & Ucar, 2018: 66-69; Kaddor, Müller, & Behr, 2020: 156-157) in the context of the virtue of forgiveness.

6) Defending a different point of view

In this case (Kaddor, Müller, & Behr, 2020: 94-95), we see a dialogue between a father and his daughter Amina. Two different perspectives on the incident Amina experienced at school are displayed at the intellectual level and developed on an argumentative basis. One day, while doing class work at school, Amina and Mario receive a reprimand from the teacher. During the exam, Mario quietly wishes Rahel well, but the teacher judges that cheating has occurred and warns Mario. Amina also takes Mario's side. Then Amina also receives a warning from the teacher. Amina tells her father about the situation, and when her father asks how she can be sure about what Mario told Rachel, Amina says that she heard what was said because she lives very close to Mario and that Mario is never a cheater, even if he is a chatterbox and wants to know everything. The father claims that the teacher could not have been wrong and

that there are always students who take advantage of others in exams. Amina, in turn, lashes out at her father and asks why he does not believe her reminding him that he has always told her to oppose injustice and unfairness. The father, however, insists on his point of view and says: "Sometimes there are things that you don't really understand, even if you are very close to them. I think the teacher got it right, but you see things differently." (p. 94)

7) Different approaches to hazards

In this text (Shakir, 2019: 74-75), five young people have different opinions. The first young man says that plants and animals are under threat and danger. The second young states that if this threat and danger continue, some animal species will disappear completely. The third one explains that rivers and lakes are poisoned by chemical substances. The fourth one claims that he does not believe that nature is under threat. The fifth says that he does not believe that the environment is threatened. Two views emerge: 1) Nature and living things are under threat. 2) There is no such threat. In the caption, readers are asked which of these statements they agree with. For this, they are asked to justify their point of view or opinion. Therefore, the aim here is to raise awareness in students by questioning climate change as an indicator that nature and living things are under threat.

Analysis and discussion

Three of the seven cases (1, 2, 5) show how a problem in a historical context is solved based on various boundaries and conditions. These problems are solved by the holy, absolute and sovereign authorities putting forward the best argument. In these three cases, the three holy authorities (Prophet Muhammad, Prophet Solomon, Allah) prevent the development of the discussion as boundary and condition setting factors. When the solution cannot be found among the interlocutors, an external divine or sacred power is invoked. Thus, it

is seen that the communicative act between group members cannot evolve into a discourse in which a better argument is produced, that is, into the construction of communicative reason as "a practical reason that is procedural and requires co-operative competition for a better argument" (Englund, 2012: 29). Habermas argues that discourses are based on consensus-oriented action as a form of reflexivity of communication. In this context, discourses are already present in the mutual expectation and symmetrical conditions of consensus-oriented language use in everyday practice, in the basic designs such as equal treatment and general welfare around which all morality revolves, even in pre-modern societies (Habermas, 2020: 175). One cannot speak of democracy in a pre-modern society, but it is also argued that a pluralistic and egalitarian structure (Islamic governance, constitution, shura, consent, Medina Convention/Constitution) was provided as a source of democracy in the Prophet's time (Tahzeeb, 2014; Islam and Islam, 2017). There is no coordination and testing of individual perspectives of different interpretations, i.e. there is no observance of the principle of universalisation (Habermas, 1990), where each person places his or her perspective in the perspective of everyone else. Group members are not able to present their own valid arguments with convincing justifications as equal discursive partners. Even if a better argument can eventually be produced within the group, the final decision for consensus comes from the sacred authorities. In this context Habermas states: "Every justified truth-claim of a proposer must be defended with reasons against the objections of possible opponents, and must ultimately await the rationally motivated approval/consent of the entire interpretation-community. However, it is not enough to rely on any particular community of interpretation" (Habermas, 2020: 178). A community of interpretation or a sacred local/ particular authority mean the same thing. According to Habermas, argumentation is a procedure for the change, exchange and evaluation of information, justifications and terminologies.

On the other hand, in the "black stone" incident, asking various questions under the text (why the conflict arose, how it was resolved, what was Muhammad's suggestion, etc.) refers to taking a self-reflexive didactic attitude in terms of making students think about conflict resolution in modern conditions. However, there is a contradiction between finding a single address of the solution in the story (the prophet Muhammad) and convincing the students that there may be different ways of conflict resolution in the conditions of the day. When asked why Muhammad was wise and fair in his solution (Ucar, 2019: 51), there is an imposition on the students. Because this approach may prevent students from producing other solution proposals regarding this event.

In one of the other four current events (3), argumentation is not developed in nature, whereas in the other three events (4, 6, 7), argumentation is developed in the sense of discussion among the group members and the assertion of one's own thesis, justification and acceptance. In the third case, the father responds to his daughter's question as an active, sovereign and wise authority and the daughter listens. Since the daughter has no knowledge, she has no arguments. In the other three cases (4, 6, 7), each student has an argument in the group discussion. Berkan objects to the solution suggestion (seeing Muhammad as a role model for the solution) coming from within the group about the solution of his current and practical problem (his era and Muhammad's era are different) and continues to search for an argument (solution). The differentiation of arguments within the group enables the formation and continuation of argumentation, which in turn provides an opportunity for the formation of discourse ethics. However, the group's argument imposes a limit and condition on seeing Muhammad as a solution. These, namely limis and conditions, are clearly visible in the fifth case, the drama of the prophet Joseph or Yusuf. The main religious message of the text (God does not leave people in distress alone) is also expressed through fate (God's determination to the lives of His servants)

as a limit and condition. The religious discourse in the text is not based on a struggle against wrongdoers (e.g. Joseph's or Yusuf's brothers, the family who sold him into slavery), but on the understanding of resignation to a fate in which good deeds will be rewarded by Allah. Instead of struggling against his brothers who threw him into the well, the family who sold him into slavery, slavery or enslavement, or even prison conditions, Joseph or Yusuf is content with using his talent (dream interpretation) and thanks to this talent he is able to survive. Here there is a contradiction between fate (divine determination) and talent (individual success). Joseph's or Yusuf's individual success (his ability to interpret dreams correctly) is, of course, in the final analysis a part of the destiny. Although fate as a limit and forgiveness as a condition prevents the parties from producing a rational argument, Joseph's or Yusuf's persuasion of Pharaoh about what needs to be done in the time of famine emerges as the best argument. Here we have a limited and conditional argumentation determined in and through a kind of fate. However, the main place where the argumentation is asked to be developed through this event is in the sub-text questions. In these questions, students are asked to interpret the event and think about how they would solve such a problem if it happened to them. Therefore, students are called upon to think through this historical story, to produce solutions and to reconstruct events from their own perspectives. However, the text has a very positive and appropriate connotation: To go abroad or to be separated from one's homeland. The statement in the book is as follows: "Even today there are many people who have left their homeland because..." (Khorchide, 2012: 72). There is a reference here to Yusuf's forced departure from his homeland Jerusalem and travelling to Egypt. It is an important issue that people of Muslim origin in Germany have a history of migration, thus leaving their original homeland and making Germany a new homeland for themselves. In the above statement, students are invited to think about the reasons for leaving their

original homeland. The open-ended nature of this statement can be interpreted as an invitation to think creatively and critically.

In the sixth case, even if the arguments of Amina and her father are different, this difference does not end the dialogue, on the contrary, it enables it to continue. However, the father's defence of the teacher, who represents an authority, rather than his child, whom he knows very well, may mean the acceptance of knowledge, manners and expertise on the part of the teacher in terms of modernisation, but here, at the same time, the expectation of loyalty to an authority (the teacher, the father) causes the Muslim father to reject the arguments of his daughter who tries to become a subject. However, the father and his daughter Amina freely and equally engage in a search for truth (is the teacher's behaviour right or wrong?), guided by their own arguments, which they think are right and best, and seek democratic reconciliation through a pragmatic act of dialogue. While Amina seeks approval/consent from her father, the father continues the argumentation by claiming that his daughter is wrong. Therefore, the rational discourse that emerges from the arguments put forward by the two subjects as true and ideal on an argumentative basis plays the role of a procedure that explains the moral point of view, as Habermas says. When the father claims that cheating in the exam is an immoral behaviour, he places his rational discourse on a moral basis. However, Amina tries to strengthen her argument by claiming that her father always advised her to stand against injustice and that the teacher's warnings to her and Mario during the exam were unjust, that is, immoral.

In the seventh incident, all five young people have their own rational arguments. However, the main point to which the argumentation is connected with the information and discussions about the ecological disaster against nature, the environment and living creatures is the "responsibility" that God has placed on

the back of human beings in terms of creating the whole universe from a religious point of view. The following statement in the text already explains this: "God's creation as Responsibility-Honesty" (Shakir, 2019: 74). Therefore, man has a divine duty in this regard. This divine duty is described in a surah on this page. It is said in the Surah that Allah has appointed man as His successor to inherit and protect His inheritance on earth because "creation has been entrusted to man by Allah" (p. 76). Man's duties as a caliph are explained by virtue of creation. Therefore, secular didactic techniques (discussion, argumentation, scientific research and consciousness, etc.) should of course be used to solve the problems in secular life (environmental problems and the danger of extinction of some species, wasting resources, waste, etc.), but the responsibility given by creation should not be forgotten. The message that there is no contradiction between religion and science is also implicitly given here. At the bottom of page 75, a young girl wearing a headscarf gives technical information about the use of resources that cause environmental destruction. Therefore, many issues concerning secular (non-religious) life such as science, ecology, recycling, environment, waste, etc. are based on a surah, verse or hadith and justified within the framework of Islamic logic. Many issues such as clean environment, potable water resources, protection of forests are directly explained with the relevant verses, surahs and hadiths (Shakir, 2019: 76-77, 80).

In order to reveal how the Habermasian model of argumentation was used in these case studies and what the problems of adaptation in this use were, we conducted a detailed categorical analysis (Table 2). We considered seven different categories as the epistemic cognitive skills required to solve the problem by making and defending each validity claim. These categories are the argumentative elements that subjects need to use in order to articulate and justify a truth claim in communication.

1) Rational assumption: According to Habermas, people who communicate have to assume that each person is rational in order to understand each other in order to communicate (Habermas, 2016: 28). The actors in the texts have accepted this prerequisite of being rational because they communicate with one another, produce counter-arguments and reach a consensus. Otherwise, dialogue, discussion and conclusion could not take place. The members of the Quraysh tribe arguing among themselves in the case of the black stone, the farmer and the shepherd agreeing to go to court to resolve the dispute, the dialogue between the father and his daughter, the emergence of different ideas about Berkan's problem and their discussion, the communication in various environments in the case of Prophet Joseph or Yusuf, the development of the debate in the case of Amina, the emergence and defence of different argumentative positions in the ecological issue are indicators that the parties assume each other rationally.

2) Reference to the objective world: The second step requires an object to be subject to rational assumption. According to Habermas, each speaker must refer to something in the objective world in which they are situated, from the horizon of their shared lifeworld, in order for their communication process to be successful (Habermas, 2016: 30). This something is, respectively, "the sanctity of the black stone in the Kaaba", "the sheep entering the field and the crop being ruined", "the Koran", "the group of friends", "Joseph", "the self" and "the protection of nature and living things". These are both a cause of disagreement and a subject of solution, which are referred to in the objective world. Without such an object (world), no claim to truth or validity can be made. Therefore, even if the interlocutors in communication have different lifeworlds, they can agree with each other beyond these lifeworlds because, assuming a common objective world, they focus on their truth claims, i.e. the unconditional validity of their own statements (Habermas, 2016: 36).

3) Being convinced to give reasons: Argumentative statements, however irrational, bizarre, enigmatic, problematic or contradictory, play a positive role in provoking interlocutors to question (Habermas, 2016: 36). Even if one thinks that one's interlocutor's claims are not rational, one continues to communicate, thinking that he or she is trying to rationally legitimise his or her claims. This shows that the agents can agree among themselves (Habermas, 2016: 38). However, it should not be difficult to understand that the 'good reason' here stems from the fact that the assumption of rationality is open to refutation. Since this leads to competition, rivalry and the search for mutual compromise, it ensures the continuation of the communicative act. The good reasons in the texts are respectively: Merit (the justification that I am worthy to replace the stone is not rational because it prevents agreement and reconciliation), recourse to divine authority (Solomon through Daud), the reconciliation of the father and daughter by producing a common "good justification" (argument) that the Qur'an cannot contain all kinds of current information, the role modelling of the prophet Muhammad seems to be a good justification, but it is controversial in terms of its application to the present, but the communicative action continues. Joseph's or Yusuf's forgiveness is presented as a good justification because it is acceptable in the sight of God, but the argumentation does not continue in richer content, it stops at some point. Amina and her father's "good reasons" clash, and the argumentation continues in a rich way to challenge the debate and rethink both positions. In the final text, the two different positions give the message that argumentation should be continued in the debate.

4) The principle of universalisation: According to Habermas, the principle of universalisation is based on "normative universalism". Normative universalism is a function of collective endeavour, which is not anchored a priori in foundationalist or teleological principles (e.g. Hegel's absolute spirit), but rather is a historical outcome (Habermas, 1990: 170). This principle is not given and

mystical, but constructive. According to Habermas, the ethical nature of the process of reaching a consensus is based on the general principle of justice, and not merely on an opinion/person's conception of the good life. Discourse as a consensus-building process brings about social stability that is not based on coercion; it enables individuals and groups to move beyond selfish interests and essentialist perspectives by appealing to the common good, which is a normative requirement (Joldersma and Crick, 2012: 139). According to Habermas, discourse ethics, beyond power relations based on coercion, injustice and illegitimacy, "defends an ethic of equal respect and solidaristic responsibility for all" (Habermas, 2005: 39). Equal respect and solidaristic responsibility is an ethical stance for Habermas and addresses the plurality of contemporary societies (Joldersma and Crick, 2012: 139). Therefore, it is possible to achieve this normative universalism through discourse ethics, and for this, it is necessary to move away from particular interests (self-interest, essential perspective, force, absolutism, etc.) and fulfil the requirements of modern democracy (participatory democracy, active citizenship, etc.). Therefore, the goal of discourse ethics as a moral theory is democracy. This can only be achieved if discourse participants are free from the pressures of everyday life and action in the sense of allowing the best argument to win in the search for consensus through argumentation in order to verify truth claims (Conle, 2012: 157).

According to Habermas, the principle of universalisation is one of the three principles of discourse ethics (the other two being cognitivism and justice vis-à-vis the good). Accordingly, in order for a norm to be valid, the consequences that may arise from the fulfilment of particular interests when this norm is followed must be accepted by everyone (Habermas, 1990: 120). This is the general acceptance of a particular value, i.e. the principle of universalisation. It is the generalisation of a particular perspective. In the case of the black stone,

each member of the Quraysh tribe pursues his/her particular interest (I will place the stone because I am worthy of it), but here the particular claim cannot be generalised; therefore, a general position cannot be reached by accepting a particular position within the group. The consensus reached is also conditional, i.e. it is conditional on Muhammad being holy, authoritative and trustworthy, and is in fact conditioned by a local value (Islamic land, culture and religion). Therefore, the principle of universalisation in the first case is only limited (Muhammad) and conditional (sacred authority). In the second case, the farmer and the shepherd cannot agree and seek a solution by going to a higher authority, namely the court. In this case too, a solution is found by accepting a particular/local power (the wisdom of Solomon) as an authority; however, a particular power of the parties (their own argument) does not play a role and the solution is limited (Solomon) and conditional (divine wisdom) as in the first case; Solomon's proposed solution is generalised (in the sense of truth) but this generalisation is based on loyalty, not argumentation. In the third case, the dialogue between father and daughter about the inclusiveness of the Qur'an does not produce argumentation; the daughter accepts her father as an authority and his opinion is generalised for both parties. The father's age/knowledge authority is accepted by his inexperienced and uninformed daughter. In the fourth case, since Berkan and his friends defend their particular views (validity claims) to the end, one of the parties cannot get his particular perspective accepted and the argumentation does not end but continues unlimitedly and unconditionally (without any internal or external coercion). Joseph or Yusuf has claims and is accepted by the group, his particular perspective seems to generalise and gain the status of a universalising principle, but in fact here Joseph's or Yusuf’s claim, even though it is verified at the factual level (as in his prediction of famine), does not produce an argumentation because it becomes limited and conditional according to the claim of "fate". In the sixth case, both sides try to universalise their particular position by making it accepted, which leads to

argumentation. In the last case, each argumentator is open to validating his/her claim, but we cannot say that the discursive partners overcome their particular positions and apply the principle of universalisation, i.e. that a compromise is reached.

5) Rational discourse: Habermas considers "rational discourse" as an appropriate procedure for resolving conflicts because rational discourse ensures that everyone in the communicative act or debate is involved and that all interests are equally taken into account (Habermas, 2020: 48). In other words, rational discourse, due to its potential for rationality, constitutes the ground or practice of the most appropriate procedure for the debaters. In our case studies, it is not possible to say that all particular interests are taken into account equally. In the case of the black stone, each individual Qurayshite has the right to hold the end of the rug and objections are overcome, but even though the right seems to be equally distributed, there is a clear inequality between the Quraysh and Muhammad. This prevents the formation of rational discourse between the partners. Solomon brings the farmer and the shepherd together at a relatively fair point, but the parties are not equal discursive partners; inequality in terms of authority, holiness and power limits and conditions the formation of rational discourse. The father and his daughter Amina agree that the Qur'an cannot encompass all knowledge. Although the parties appear to be equal partners, the position of the father as the epistemic authority disrupts equality and the monopoly of knowledge limits/conditions argumentation. However, Berkan and his friends seem to disagree on Muhammad as a role model for today's people and problems, but even if they disagree, that is, even if one of the arguments is not accepted as the better argument, a rational discourse is constructed that the argumentation should continue, because the parties are equal discursive partners. In the final analysis, Joseph or Yusuf and those around him reconcile and make peace, and a rational discourse is constructed

through forgiveness. The better argument here is forgiveness, but even if forgiveness seems to be on the subject's own initiative, it is actually God's command; obeying this command shows that the better argument is of religious origin. Rational discourse is again limited and conditional. Amina and her father disagree about the teacher's behaviour, but a strong rational discourse emerges that there should be different arguments. The same is true for young people discussing ecological threats and dangers. As equal discursive partners, each opinionated subject contributes to constructing the rational discourse so that argumentation can occur and continue. Consequently, in all cases, each subject is involved in the discussion based on communicative action, but not all interests are equally taken into account.

6) Validity claims: According to Habermas, a communicative act involves the presentation of a series of "validity claims" by the speaker for the acceptance of the interlocutor, who is an equal discursive partner (Redding, 1989: 16). If communication is to continue within the group, argumentative claims must be able to be challenged, defended and qualified; they must also have logical coherence (Andrews, 2009: 10). In other words, each claim should be able to be countered by a counterclaim. There should be no coercion in reaching a common understanding. Rational consensus, which is the ultimate goal in communicative action, is also the ultimate criterion of truth, and the resolution of truth claims is based on argumentative reasoning; the goal of practical discourse based on communicative action is to reach a rationally motivated agreement on problematic truth claims, which agreement is not based on internal or external constraints on the debate, but is simply the result of the strength of evidence and argument (Han, 2002: 152). Everyone's attempt to validate their claims with the better argument and to reach rational agreement is based on the rejection of the conception of a single, knowing and absolute subject. Therefore, meaning is created through intersubjective agreement. In our

texts, subjects have "validity claims". These claims are based on certain propositions. The argument on which the claims are based can refer to factual propositions, moral rules or the subjective experiences of the actor (Han, 2002: 156). The issue is whether these propositions, norms and experiences, which are the basis of the actor's claims, are discussed in a communicative-rational way. The argument of each Qurayshite is clear: I am worthy to place the stone in the Ka'bah (traditional sense of honour). The tribal honour dispute is resolved by the intervention of divine authority (external constraint), but the rationality here is limited and conditional. The Quraysh cannot make a valid claim for themselves. There is no exchange (intersubjective agreement), religious traditional authority prevails. The farmer and the shepherd cannot convince each other, they cannot come to an agreement; therefore their validity claim does not produce a better argument and they have to resort to divine authority (external power). Amina's argument (why is there no information about polar bears in the Qur'an?) is countered by the father's better argument (not all information is in the Qur'an) and a rational solution is found. In order to justify his argument that the prophet Muhammad cannot be a role model for him, Berkan bases his claim on the incompatibility between oldness (Muhammad's time) and novelty (the current problem). Berkan is in a position to make a better argument here, but even though there is no intersubjective consensus (the students in the classroom), the debate goes on and on, but remains inconclusive. Yusuf and everyone around him has a claim, but the claims subjected to verification oscillate between the factual (taking measures against famine) and the fateful (Yusuf's fate). In the end, the problem is solved by the fulfilment of fate (an external force, a sacred belief). In the cheating argument between Amina and her father, the arguments of both sides are clear and they try to validate their claims. And the process of finding a rational solution emerges. The daughter talks about facts (Mario is not a cheater; factual proposition based on testimony) and the father talks about confidence (the teacher cannot be

wrong). The discussion is left inconclusive and students are asked to think about the issue. In the last case, the students are not told which of the two arguments about whether nature and living things are under threat is better and are asked to continue discussing the issue. However, each subject proposes an argument to validate their claim. The thesis that the issue can be discussed from different perspectives is a kind of rational compromise.

7) Ideal speech situation: The ideal speech situation is a result based on "communicative action". It shows the strength of the better argument. Communicative action is action orientated towards achieving a certain understanding. The goal is to reach an agreement within the intersubjective community that results in "mutual comprehension", "shared knowledge", "reciprocal trust" and "accord with one another" (Habermas, 2004). The ideal communicative situation is the methodological standard used to reconstruct and critique the assumptions of everyday conversational communication (Han, 2002, 153). The "ideal" here is actually, as Robert Young put it in the context of the school classroom, to be able to rationally evaluate different views, or at least to keep them open to rational evaluation (Han, 2002: 153). Even if there is communication between subjects in our historical examples, it is not possible to say that this communication creates an ideal situation in the Habermasian sense (the acceptance of the validity claim of the strongest argument creates consensus within the group). In current events, although some authorities (teacher, father) seem to come to the fore in the intersubjective discussion, students/children, by producing their own arguments and taking the defence position, realise two aspects of the ideal communication situation: Firstly, initiating and sustaining argumentation; and secondly, by doing so, taking a self-reflexive stance, questioning rival arguments through their own problem, building the argumentative basis of their own position and insisting on validity claims. In the final analysis, however, in all cases we see a Habermasian ideal

of dialogue (albeit limited and contingent in some cases) in the sense that a common agreement is reached, however finished or open-ended.

Conclusion

In this study we have interpreted argumentation in the texts of Islamic religion textbooks taught in Germany on the basis of Habermas' model. In some texts (3, 4, 6, 7) we have seen how argumentation is used as a methodological tool, showing that students are able to defend their own arguments against authorities. Although these are contemporary fictional examples in modern secular society, they are of the kind that can often be seen in a school setting. In the other historical texts, however, we found that argumentation (1, 2, 5) was not fully realised and was limited and conditioned by a number of factors (divine power, sacred authority, local sovereign). Therefore, in the texts where students were able to produce and defend their arguments, it is possible to argue that argumentation can create an epistemic transformation in consciousness and provide a strong democratic learning opportunity on the way to modernisation, while in other historical cases, the dogmatic structure of religion prevents argumentation from fully taking place and prevents the modernisation of consciousness and subject that Habermas expects. While communicative reason is constructed through the independent and autonomous efforts of the subjects themselves, each subject prevents "reflexivity, which for Habermas is learning to step back from one's own tradition and understand others from their point of view" (Morrow, 2012: 65), a necessary element for the epistemic transformation and modernisation of consciousness.

The recourse to the legitimate powers inherent in the dogmatic structure of religion blocks the way for subjects to propose other solutions, i.e. argumentation. This prevents Habermasian self-reflexive learning and hinders the modernisation of consciousness. Undoubtedly, a consensus is seen in all

cases, even though an ethics of discourse based on argumentation does not occur. However, in some texts, for example between the father and his daughter Amina, even if there is reconciliation, we have seen that the parties, as equal discursive partners, find it difficult to participate in a search for truth within the framework of the unique compulsion of the better argument. The coercive force is sacred or secular authority. Authority inhibits rational discourse (the argumentation procedure) and practical discourse (the process of compromise that encourages everyone to take on the ideal role). This is because authority causes the subject to abandon his or her own argument by relying on traditional forms of loyalty, rather than constructing and promoting his or her own propositions. Nevertheless, the texts show that argumentation as a didactic method is highly functional within the pedagogical system for the Muslim subject to acquire a reflexive and critical competence or skill at the epistemic level. This method, which we have interpreted within the framework of Habermas' model, can of course be practically explored in other phases of Islamic religious education (such as curriculum formulation, teacher's lecturing, students' various social activities within the school).

Notes

1. Five characteristics of an ideal-typical Western postsecular society are identified as follows: 1) Reflexivity: Religious traditions that step outside their own narrow, absolute and universal semantic universe and adopt a democratic, rational and critical stance reflect on themselves and engage in exchange with opposing traditions. 2) Coexistence: The coexistence of religious and secular worldviews and practices in the same public space and the reconciliation of overlapping interests. 3) De-privatisation of religion. 4) Religious pluralism. 5) The sacred takes different forms: These different forms can be transcendent as well as immanent and civil (Rosati and Stoeckl, 2012; Rosati, 2012; Beamont and Baker, 2011).

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